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In view of the significant developments that the European Union’s (EU) political environment has 
undergone, this study aims at examining whether it’s institutions have adapted their political 
communication efforts credibly. The decade of 2008 to 2018 gave birth to fundamental 
environmental changes and major crisis confronting European liberal democracies and the whole 
Union. The digital transformation, the Eurozone and refugee crises and the rise of populist 
euroscepticism have changed the way citizens perceive the EU. The fact that most research in this 
field was conducted before this decade makes it urgent to examine the status-quo of the institutions 
communication and answer this study’s research question: Are the EU’s political communication 
actions up-to-date with the latest developments? To answer this, the study examines the 
developments in Germany and Portugal, that, being traditionally pro-European countries, were 
significantly affected by the different developments. Consisting of a two-step-analysis, the study 
includes a qualitative content analysis of the EU institutions’ awareness campaigns in  2018/2019 
and a SWOT-analysis for the mid- to long term perspectives. The central finding of this study is 
that although the EU institutions are using the right tools to communicate to citizens they have 
missed out to confront the main drivers for euroscepticism and therefore reach citizens who are 
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"We will fail in our efforts to prosper if we do not learn a hard lesson: we have not 
yet convinced the people of Europe and the world that our Union is not just here to 
survive, but can also thrive and prosper."1 
In 2015 the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, chose these words to 
recognize that the European Union (EU) had still not convinced European citizens that it really 
has an impact on people’s lives. Previously, in both elections to the European Parliament, in 2009 
and 2014, Europe had seen it’s lowest participation in a European Parliament election ever. The 
EU and its citizens have developed a challenging relationship throughout the years.  
 
A challenging relationship which is vital because it is the basis of any democratic legitimation of 
the European project as a whole. Given this special intergovernmental and, to a certain extent, 
supranational character, it constitutes a particular triangle of relations: EU institutions - national 
governments - citizens. Whether in the European Commission, the European Council, the 
European Parliament or any other institutions, European politics shape this continent and affect 
member states as well as EU-citizens. Especially the years from 2008 to 2018 have shown how 
fragile the EU project can be in times of crisis: the financial and the debt crisis, so called “Eurozone 
crisis” affecting mostly southern member states, such as Portugal; and the refugee and migration 
crisis, affecting a variety of other EU countries, such as Germany. The first withdrawal of a 
member state2 is also an undeniable symptom of this fateful decade for Europe, demonstrating how 
vulnerable the European project is to the rise of populist and Anti-European parties. If the EU 
really intends to convince citizens that it does not merely exist to survive but rather to make a 
difference in people’s lives, it needs to tackle the most important “ingredient” of any liberal 
democracy: it’s ‘heartbeat’, the EU citizens.   
 
How can European leaders improve the organization’s connection with it’s heartbeat? “Winston 
Churchill is said to have observed that the principal difference between management and 
                                                
1 Jean-Claude Juncker. State of the Union speech. In Strategic Plan 2016/2020. 2015: 3.  
2 Note: The Brexit referendum will not play an important role in this study seeing the situation is - by the time this 
thesis is being written - changing permanently. 
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leadership is communication.”3 The former British prime minister gets to the core of what he 
identifies to make a decisive difference in political leadership: Communication. Communication 
creates a basis for European leaders and institutions to ensure a sustainable relation with citizens. 
As Niklewicz highlights: 
“The general public evaluates the EU’s performance on the basis of what is 
communicated about its decision making and activities, and about the conduct of 
its representatives. In a time when many citizens have lost faith in governments and 
institutions, proper communication is more important than ever. Only authentic 
communication can reassure people that things are under control and restore trust 
and a good reputation.“4 
In this study, I am not departing from the assumption that any evidence found on a possible 
detachment of people from the EU is necessarily only the consequence of unsuccessful EU 
communication. I am well aware of the fact that successful communication is just one of several 
possible factors which can bring citizens closer to the EU. Yet, it is an important one, which should 
not be neglected. During my recent academic courses at the institute for political studies at the 
Julius-Maximilians-Universität Würzburg, Germany, and at the Institute for Political Studies at 
the Universidade Católica Portuguesa, I have often been confronted with the perception that the 
EU suffers from an increasing detachment of citizens because it does not communicate 
successfully. ‘The EU communication officials are nothing but technocrats who, sitting in their 
‘Brussel-bubble’, have no clue of how to reach out to citizens’ credibly’5: This reflects the attitude 
of some colleagues who have drawn my attention to the issue.  
Having in mind that there are several other factors involved and that communication alone will not 
be the sole solution to the problem, I hereby attempt to explore to which extent the EU is using all 
the potential means that political communication may offer to foster its relationship to citizens.  
 
 
                                                
3 James G. Stavridis. Strategic Communication and National Security. Joint Force Quarterly. No. 45. Washington 
DC: National Defense University. 2007: 1.  
4 Konrad Niklewicz. We Need to Talk about the EU - European Political Advertising in the Post-Truth Era. Wilfried 
Martens Centre for European Studies, 2017.  
5 Note: Symbolic example for what could be a common cliché on the EU’s communication. 
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Relevance 
From an academic perspective I am distinguishing three reasons that explain this study’s 
importance for current research. First, a large part of political theorists in the field of political 
communication have primarily focused on strategies of partisan communication6. Analyzing the 
communication of an intergovernmental and supranational organization like the EU is a less 
common practice. Secondly, the majority of studies published have primarily concentrated on the 
general communication deficit of the European Union as well as on the existence of a potential 
European public sphere.7 Authors have analysed the overall efforts of the main EU-institutions to 
communicate,8 instead of doing a case-based analysis of the concrete impact of EU - 
communication on citizens’ lives. Thirdly, most of these studies were published around the turn 
of the century.9 However, in the meantime, the political environment in Europe has changed 
dramatically: the internet has given rise to different ways of communicating, major political and 
economic crisis have challenged the EU. Lastly, new political parties from the radical-right to 
radical-left with often openly anti-European programmes have increased their influence on 
citizens. I believe that these three reasons demonstrate that there is a considerable need for further 
studies.  
 
Research question  
Departing from the assumption that engaging citizens and civil society, through efficient 
communication channels, and raising awareness on fundamental achievements can contribute to 
an increase of the organizations’ legitimacy and taking into consideration what has previously been 
published: this study aims at qualitatively analyzing the latest efforts EU-institutions have made 
                                                
6 Vera Gassen; Lutz Hofer; Eike Mark Rinke, Torsten Stollen. Düsseldorfer Forum - Politische Kommunikation. 
LIT Verlag Dr. W. Hopf, 2007: 38 ff; David M. Farrell. Political Parties as Campaign Organizations. In Parties 
Without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies. Oxford Scholarship Online, 2002. 
7 Ruud Koopmans. Who inhabits the European public sphere? Winners and losers, supporters and opponents in 
Europeanised political debates. European Journal of Political Research. Vol. 46, 2004: 183-210; Michael 
Brüggemann. Information Policy and the Public Sphere - EU Communications and the Promises of Dialogue and 
Transparency. Journal of the European Institute for Communication and Culture. Vol. 17, 2014: 5-21. 
8 Niklewicz, 2017: 1. 
9 Erik Oddvar Eriksen. An Emerging European Public Sphere. European Journal of Social Theory. Vol. 8, 2005: 
341-361; Ruud Koopmans, 2004: 183-210; Christoph Meyer. Political Legitimacy and the Invisibility of Politics: 
Exploring the European Union’s Communication Deficit. Journal of Common Market Studies. Vol. 34, 1999: 617-
639; Philip Schlesinger. Changing Spaces of Political Communication: The Case of the European Union. Journal of 
Political Communication. Vol. 16, 2001: 263-279. 
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to respond to the developments that have changed the citizens attitudes. Has EU communication 
reacted to the changed realities? In particular: has it credibly incorporated this changing political 
environment in the way it communicates the specific EU impact and benefits of funding 
programmes? Leading us to the research question:  
 
Is the EU’s political communication up to date with the changing environment?  
 
Methodology 
The study consists of two main parts: a descriptive and an analytical part. After considering the 
changing environment affecting citizens in their attitude towards the EU and describing several 
communication campaigns in the descriptive part, we will proceed with a content analysis10 of 
political communication. This content analysis is a cross-sectional-study aiming at qualitatively 
analysing the main communication campaigns of EU institutions in 2018/2019. The analysis 
integrates a criteria catalogue which includes variables deriving from the analysis of literature 
within the descriptive part. This catalogue will be applied to several campaigns. I have chosen to 
employ such a content analysis because it enables us to draw qualitative conclusions on how the 
EU institutions have responded to the major political and technological developments and to 
answer whether the current policy of communication may be considered “up-to-date”. The EU 
support before and after the campaigns 2018/2019 will also be discussed, bearing in mind that 
support for the EU is generated by a variety of factors. Although the cross-sectional design of this 
study does not make it possible to find exact correlations between communication efforts and 
support throughout time, it will be essential to identify recommendations on the content and tools 
that need to be engaged to strengthen the organization's communication.  
 
The data used to conduct this study is gathered through the analysis of primary sources. These may 
be strategic plans, general guidelines, decisions and directives emitted by the European 
Commission at the strategic level as well as campaigns including websites, social media, 
brochures, videos, TV or radio coverage. As far as data on political participation and support of 
citizens is concerned, this study uses mainly data gathered from the Eurobarometer, Eurostat and 
                                                
10 Howard Berg. Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences. Pearson. Vol. 8, 2012: 338. ff.  
9 
national statistical agencies such as the Statistisches Bundesamt (StBA) and the Instituto Nacional 
de Estatística (INE). 
 
Disposition and structure 
This introduction will be followed by the main part with four chapters. The first chapter relates to 
the particular message of the communication that we will be focusing on: The EU-impact in 
citizens’ lives through the funding programmes. The chapter will include a specification on how 
recent funding programmes had an impact on citizens in Germany and Portugal. The second 
chapter will discuss the changing environment, inputs and requirements that emerge for European 
leaders and responsible communication officers. The EU’s specific political communication 
campaigns will be discussed in chapter 3 as well as the theoretical relevance of political 
communication in political systems. In the fourth and last chapter of the main part a two-step-
analysis will be employed. In a first step, the content analysis will give insights about the quality 
and adaptivity of the previously discussed campaigns. In a second step the SWOT-analysis will 
offer future perspectives for the EU’s political communication. The final chapter will discuss the 
content analysis’ results in the context of both, the German and the Portuguese political reality. 
Moreover, readers will be provided with recommendations on how the EU could strengthen its 
communication in the future.  
 
Choice of countries 
The EU is made of and for the citizens in its member states. Any case study on the EU should 
therefore take into account the different realities of its members and the triangle-relations emerging 
from the coexistence of EU institutions, the member states governments and the citizens. In the 
process of discussing and examining the EU’s communication, I will therefore regularly refer to 
Germany and Portugal as practical examples, in order to exemplify an EU-wide issue.  
 
There are mainly three reasons that made me choose the cases of Portugal and Germany. Firstly, 
due to my personal background, I am able to gather and evaluate German and Portuguese data 
having access to universities, their scientific databases, relevant institutions and studies within this 
area in both countries. Secondly, both countries offer a large number of differences, both political 
and economic, providing appropriate references to analyse a common European communication 
10 
policy. Their differences will contribute to provide answers and recommendations on how the EU 
can better deal with the heterogeneity of its member states. Thirdly, Germany and Portugal offer 
at the same time some EU-specific similarities. Both are similar in their degree of EU integration 
and their public support. They are fully integrated EU member states, both within the Euro- zone, 
the single market and the Schengen Area. Citizens in both countries, according to the European 
Parliament’s Eurobarometer of 2019, rank high in their EU support: 76 percent of German and 69 
percent of Portuguese citizens believe that their countries membership is a ‘good thing’, in both 
cases above the EU average of 61 percent.11 This, together with the fact that governments of both 
states seem to traditionally have strong pro-European attitudes12 creates similar structural 
parameters needed to compare two countries according to Lauth.13 Especially the similar pro-
European attitude both the citizens and the governments of Portugal and Germany provide an 
environment for this comparison in which the EU’s communication efforts could be best evaluated. 
The analysis of this environment could deliver solutions on what the EU and other actors involved 
are doing right to achieve support as well as provide us with insight on what can still be improved.  
 
As much as possible, I have used sources which allow an overview of both countries. But I did not 












                                                
11 European Parliament. Spring Eurobarometer 2019. Eurobarometer Survey 91.1 of the European Parliament. 
2019e: 15.   
12 Note: As we will see in chapter 2.3.3.  
13 Hans-Joachim Lauth. Politikwissenschaft eine Einführung. Ferdinand Schöningh, 2016: 114.  
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1. The Message: The EU’s impact on citizens. 
Any communication needs a message to convey. What is the message we focus on when looking 
at the several EU awareness campaigns? After contextualising the EU and its core ambitions, this 
chapter will proceed with examining what impact the EU has on member states, in this case 
Germany and Portugal. To do so, we will focus on the European Cohesion and Regional Funds in 
Portugal and Germany. Analysing these policies and their effect on people's lives is an important 
basis for the analysis of the Union's political communication.  
 
1.1. Core ambitions: A Union for citizens? 
In corporate communication it is fundamental that the employees identify themselves and know 
the company's core values to be able to credibly communicate. But what about in politics? It seems 
logical that political communication is more efficient if the sending entities are aware of their core 
values, constitutions or functioning: so what does the EU stands for?  
When, in May 1950, one of the founding fathers of the EU, Robert Schuman, presented his famous 
“Schuman Declaration”, proposing the creation of a European Coal and Steel Community, few 
people would have imagined what this community would become more than half a century later. 
The French statesman proposed that the Franco-German production of coal and steel as a whole 
would be placed under a common High Authority, within the framework of an organization open 
to the participation of the other countries of Europe.”14 A project which was still very distant from 
the EU we know today, but a significant step towards it: Schuman’s proposal quickly became 
reality with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 binding Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany, Italy and France to an economic cooperation, at least in the 
sectors of coal and steel. What Schuman intended to achieve with his declaration went far beyond 
pure economic reasons. Schuman’s vision of an “organised and living Europe” was that peace 
would be established and maintained across the continent.15 His ratio: peace through economic 
interconnection of countries.  
Schuman's vision of an united Europe received a significant boost with the signing of the Treaty 
of Rome in 1957. As specified, the preamble of what many call the birth treaty of the European 
                                                
14 Robert Schuman. Declaration of 9th may 1950 delivered by Robert Schuman. Fondation Robert Schuman. 
European Issue. No. 204. 10.5.2011. 1950: 1.  
15 Schuman, 1950: 1. 
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project, the six founding States were “Determined to establish the foundation of an ever closer 
union among the European peoples” as well as “directing their efforts to the essential purpose of 
constantly improving the living and working conditions of their peoples.”16 Article 2 of the Treaty 
states:17 “The Union's aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples”18.This 
proves that, since the beginning, the “European people” stand in the center of attention of the 
European integration.  
Today, more than 60 years later, this legislative commitment is an integral part of the European 
legislation. It is important for this study because it aims at achieving a close relationship with the 
citizens. This can be achieved through democratic inclusion of citizens on the one hand but also 
through transparency and communication on the other. Of course, treaties can be interpreted in 
various ways. The general intention to improve people’s lives must be judged based on actual 
implementation of policies. This raises the question: What has the EU done to improve its citizens 
“living and working conditions”?19 
 
1.2. Searching for impact: Funding 
On the search for impact this study concentrates on a very important aspect of the EU policy: Why 
are funding programmes relevant to analyse the EU’s political communication? The wide field of 
projects funded by EU institutions represents 76 percent of the EU budget.20 Like the freedom of 
movement and the single market, the funding programmes are fundamental for the EU’s impact 
on people's lives. Yet, citizens don't seem to be aware or to acknowledge the importance of this 
field. A look into the 2018 Eurobarometer shows that 58 percent of over 27 thousand21 interviewed 
Europeans see the freedom of movement of people, goods, and services within the EU as one of 
the “most positive” results of the EU,22 followed by the idea that the European project has 
                                                
16 Treaties establishing the European Communities, 1957: 25. 
17 Note: Amended by the Treaty of Lisbon. 
18 Treaty on the European Union. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union. Art 2a. 2010. 
19  Note: As the establishing treaties of the Union suggest. See: Treaties establishing the European Communities, 
1957: 25. 
20 European Union. About: EU Funding. 2019a: 1. https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/funding-grants_en 
(last accessed: 13.4.2019 / 17:00).  
21 Standard Eurobarometer 90. First results. Public opinion in the European Union. 2018. 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD/sur
veyKy/2215 (last accessed: 13.4.2019 / 18:00).  
22 Standard Eurobarometer 90, 2018: 34. 
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contributed to peace among member states. 54 percent believe this to be one of the greatest 
achievements.23 Surprisingly, the EU funding programmes were not identified as a major impact 
by the citizens in the 2018 Eurobarometer. This makes more sense if we consider that many people 
are not even aware of several EU funded projects. Crossing Lisbon’s Vasco da Gama bridge in 
Portugal, how many people are aware of the fact that, to a large degree, it was the EU which made 
it possible?24 Or how many people taking their children and families out to one of Europe's biggest 
youth center and park, the FEZ Wuhlheide, in Berlin, are aware that it was the EU which made it 
possible to completely renovate and reopen its facilities? In fact, only very few. According to the 
Portuguese Exame magazine, in 2015 only 9 percent of the Portuguese population stated that they 
have benefited in their daily lives from the Regional25 or the Cohesion Funds and only 26 percent 
have ever heard of any project financed or sponsored by the EU in their area.  
For any study on communication of the EU it is therefore fundamental to consider this discrepancy 
between funding efforts and citizens awareness. Whether it is a bridge, the local Kindergarten, the 
local hospital or programmes to help unemployed young EU-citizens in applying for jobs: multiple 
programmes both in Germany and Portugal have a direct impact on people's lives.26  
What are the concrete numbers of the EU’s support for projects that benefited citizens lives? In 
the following, we will consider the EU funding in the case of its social and economic cohesion 
policy including the impact of funding both in Germany and Portugal.   
 
1.2.1. The Social and Economic Cohesion policy 
The Regional Fund was created in 1972, on the verge of the first enlargement. But it was following 
the second round of enlargement, that it became evident that new member countries like Greece,27 
Spain and Portugal,28 as well as Ireland,29 had structural regional weaknesses revealing a 
substantial increase in disparities within the Community. Together with the establishment of a 
Single European Market, the Single European Act of 1988 redefined the need for a social economic 
policy with a specific focus on improving the most backward or depressed regions: “In particular, 
                                                
23 idem. 
24 Exame. Investimento: Ninguém sabe dos fundos europeus. 1.11.2015: 42. 
25 Exame, 2015: 42. 
26 Note: As we will see in chapter 1.2.  
27 Note: Became a member in 1981. 
28 Note: Became members in 1986. 
29 Note: Which had already become a member in 1973. 
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the Community shall aim at reducing disparities between the various regions and the backwardness 
of the least-favoured regions.”30 The existing Structural Funds were integrated into a 
comprehensive framework based on the following key elements: focus on the poorest and most 
backward regions with a p.c. GDP inferior to 75 percent of the Community average31 in the 
framework of a multi-annual programming; Strategic orientation towards investment; Active 
involvement of national, regional and local partners, through the principle of subsidiarity.  
 
Following the sizeable enlargement of the EU to the east, welcoming ten countries in 2004 and 
two more in 2007, many of which included less developed regions, the Treaty of Lisbon, in 2007, 
reinforced the territorial focus of the cohesion policy to better achieve harmonious development, 
through the reduction of regional differences, development levels, and investment capacities, for 
the sake of an effective social, economic and territorial convergence.32  
 
The enhanced financial instruments are referred to as the European Structural and Investment 
Funds (ESIF). The ESIF are the financial instruments of the Cohesion Policy, through which the 
EU invests in local and regional projects that contribute to employment creation and sustainable 
growth. They include the following funds: 
- The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF),33 provides support to regions facing 
structural problems aiming at correcting imbalances among regions. Presently it finances 
projects in several key priorities areas such as innovation and research, the “Digital 
Agenda”, support for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) or the low carbon 
economy.34 The amount of support depends on the category of regions. 
                                                
30 The Single European Act. Official Journal of The European Communities No L 169/9. Art. 130a, 1987. 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:a519205f-924a-4978-96a2-
b9af8a598b85.0004.02/DOC_1&format=PDF (last accessed: 18.4.2019 / 15:00).  
31 Note: The so called ‘Objective 1’.  
32 Treaty of Lisbon. Official Journal of the European Union C306/1. Art. 130c, 2007. 
http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/688a7a98-3110-4ffe-a6b3-8972d8445325.0007.01/DOC_19 (last 
accessed: 10.3.2019 / 14:00). 
33 Note: The Portuguese translation is FEDER.  
34 European Commission. EU regional and urban development - Information and communication technologies. 
2019j: 1. https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/themes/ict/ (last accessed: 27.6.2019 / 13:00). 
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- The European Social Fund (ESF), created already in 1957, invests in improving 
employment and education opportunities across the EU, and promotes investment 
benefiting the most vulnerable social groups. 
- The European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) finances the implementation of the 
European fishing policy, supporting the investments in modernisation and restructuring of 
the fisheries sector. 
- The European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) supports the 
improvement in economic and social development, climate protection and sustainable 
management of natural resources in rural areas. 
- The Cohesion Fund, set up in 1993, provides extra support for poorer regions whose GNP 
per capita is less than 90 percent of the EU average, co-financing up to 85 percent of 
investments in environment projects, including in energy saving and efficiency, as well as 
in trans-European transport networks.   
How does this funding mechanism work in practice and what impact does it have on the member 
states and the citizens lives? In the following we will look into some of the above mentioned 
funding programmes implemented in Germany and Portugal.  
 
1.2.2. Germany 
Being the country with the highest contributions towards the EU budget, approximately 21 
percent,35 there is a tendency among some German citizens to refer to their country as Europe's 
“Zahlmeister”, (“paymaster”). Such a terminology might encourage criticism on the part of those 
citizens who, in general, are supportive of the European integration, but who feel that paying such 
a great share is unfair to Germany, while nevertheless ignoring the fact that, as stated by the 
German Ministry of Finance, the country receives a great payback of “numerous EU-services”: 
the ESIF for 2014-2020 foresee a total of 27,87 billion euros for Germany. This amount is 
composed by 10,77 billion euros from the Regional Fund (ERDF); 9,38 billion euros from the 
                                                
35 Note: In august 2018 see: Bundesfinanzministerium. Auf den Punkt. Informationen aus dem 
Bundesfinanzministerium, 2018: 1. https://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Downloads/Broschueren_ 
Bestellservice/2017-08-25-auf-den-punkt-eu-haushalt.pdf?_blob=publicationFile&v=15 (last accessed: 4.3.2019 
/10:00). 
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EAFRD; 7,5 billion euros support to the integration in the labour market of long-term unemployed, 
of migrants and of disadvantaged youngsters (ESF); 220 million euros from the EMFF.36  
 
According to the European Commission, EU support for Germany aims at i.a.: strengthening the 
competitiveness of small and medium sized businesses; supporting the innovation capacity of the 
economy, fostering research and development; reducing regional disparities in the labour market 
and strengthening its potentials; achieving social inclusion through education; reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions and strengthening climate protection; improving sustainability of 
aquaculture and fishing; boosting biodiversity and guaranteeing assistance in flood control. 
 
One of the most important EU-projects is “Horizon 2020”, the biggest EU-research and innovation 
programme, with a total volume of almost 80 billion euros over a period of seven years. Although 
Germany is the biggest contributor, the country also receives the largest share: In seven research 
programmes, about 16.500 German researchers are participating in 8.000 EU projects, at a total 
cost of 6.4 billion euros.37  
 
Due to the German political system, federal states have significant influence in a wide area of 
policies. Therefore, the different EU-programmes can be tailored to different regional conditions. 
Both national and regional authorities are also engaged in promoting the information and 
communication on the EU programmes and investments in the country. Specific regional 
programmes and projects affect people's lives directly. They could significantly help the Union to 
get closer to the hearts of German citizens and eventually contribute to a sustainable or even rising 
approval of the European project. It remains to be seen, however, to which extent this large and 
substantial scope of EU-funding has a positive effect on the German public opinion and whether 




                                                
36 Bundesfinanzministerium, 2018: 4. 
37 European Commission. Europäische Struktur- und Investmentfonds. 2016: 2. https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy 
/sources/policy/what/investment-policy/esif-country-factsheet/esi_funds_country_factsheet_de_de.pdf (last 
accessed: 15.6.19 / 15:20).  
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1.2.3. Portugal   
Portugal might be the contrary of a ‘paymaster’ in the German sense. In 2017 the country has 
contributed 1.375 million euros to the EU budget and received a total of 3.976 million euros.38 
Indeed, since accession in 1986, Portugal has benefited from all the EU financial instruments for 
structural improvement. In the framework of the Multiannual Financial Frameworks (MFF), 
Portugal has taken advantage of five financial packages: The QCA I, QCA II and QCA III,39 the 
Quadro de Referência Estratégico Nacional (QREN) and the Portugal 2020. According to the 
estimates presented in the comprehensive analysis “25 Years of Structural Funds” from the 
Fundação Francisco Manuel dos Santos,40 the total amount of the ESI Funds committed by the EU 
to Portugal between 1989 and 2013 surpassed 96 billion euros.41 This amount, matched with 88 
billion euros public (48 billion euros) and private (34 billion euros) Portuguese funds sums up to 
a total investment amount of 178 billion euros. This surpasses Portugal's GDP in 201242 and 
corresponds approximately to two times the GDP of Portugal in 1986, the year of accession to the 
EC. The EU inflow of funds for structural purpose represented between 2 and 3 percent of the 
Portuguese GDP up to 2006, and 1,3 percent in the period 2007 to 2013. 
 
According to the above mentioned study, in the period 1989 to 2011, the regional distribution of 
the funds benefitted the seven main Portuguese regions in varying ways: The North benefited from 
an increasing percentage of 22 to 40 percent of the funds; the Center with an increase of 20 percent 
to 28 percent. Both regions, the North and the Center together received more than 50 percent of 
all EU funds provided to Portugal. However, the metropolitan area of Lisbon, decreased its share 
from 30 percent to 5 percent. In the period of 2007 to 2013 this region was “redesigned” and was 
phased out of EU-support, emancipating itself from the poorer regions of the Union. The 
autonomous regions of Madeira and Azores are also phasing out. 
                                                
38 European Union. europa.eu. Sobre Portugal, 2019b. https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries/member- 
countries/portugal_pt (last accessed 14.3.2019 / 13:30). 
39 Note: Quadros Comunitarios de Apoio. 
40 Augusto Mateus. 25 Anos de Portugal Europeu. Fundação Francisco Manuel dos Santos, 2013. 
https://www.ffms.pt/FileDownload/db4da352-ef6a-4800-a7d7-a4d6b187a475/25-anos-de-portugal-europeu (last 
accessed: 13.2.2019 / 14:00). 
41 Note: at 2011 constant prices. 
42 Note: Portugal’s GDP in 210: 168.398 million euros. See Fundação Francisco Manuel dos Santos. Base de Dados 
Portugal Contemporâneo. [online] 2019. https://www.pordata.pt/Europa/Produto+Interno+Bruto+(Euro)-1786 (last 
accessed: 13.2.2019 / 14:20). 
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There has also been a shift of priorities during the mentioned period, from financing 
infrastructures43 and productive investments to supporting employment creation, eventually 
related with the economic crises.44  
For the period 2014 to 2020 and under the “Portugal 2020”- framework, 25,7 billion euros have 
been committed to Portugal. This amount will be consisting of 10,8 billion euros from the Regional 
Fund, 2,9 billion euros from the Cohesion Fund and 7,7 billion euros from the Social Fund.  
 
In total, according to the National Association of Portuguese Municipalities,45 Portugal will have 
profited over €100 billion through ESI Funds between 1986 and 2020. Initially these investments 
were focused in infrastructures and social equipment, which contributed visibly to the 
improvement of the basic conditions of living, water distribution, sewage systems, roads, schools. 
In all regions of Portugal, there has been an evolution to investments aimed at reinforcing local 
and urban competitiveness.46 It is clear for all municipalities, the managing entities of the Funds 
closest to the citizens, that these funds have been crucial in building the country we know today. 
The municipalities have absorbed and managed about 30% of these Funds. Their efficiency from 
planning to managing the implementation of the supported investment has allowed Portugal to be 
considered a benchmark. Since investment in local infrastructure happens very close to the people, 
having a direct effect on their everyday life, it seems safe to assume that it generates considerable 
public support. Although much of the improvement carries a European flag, it remains to be seen 






                                                
43 Note: 58 percent in the QCA I, through the Regional Fund. 
44 Note: The Social Fund having a share from 23% in the QCA I and 35% in the QREN. 
45Associação Nacional de Municípios Portugueses. XXIII Congresso, 9.12.2017, Quadro Comunitario Portugal 
2020, 2017: 1.  
46Associação Nacional de Municípios Portugueses, 2017: 10. 
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2. The Input: Changing political environment (2008 - 2018) 
The EU’s political communication aims at reaching out to the people. Therefore it seems logical 
that to be successful and credible, communication needs to consider the changing realities of 
citizens. According to David Easton, understanding and acknowledging a constantly changing 
environment surrounding citizens is fundamental to understand any field of politics: 
 
 “Much light can be shed on the working of a political system if we take into account the fact that 
much of what happens within a system has its birth in the efforts of the members of the system to 
cope with the changing environment”47.  
 
It seems therefore fundamental to ask what crucial developments or demands does this 
environment produce for the future communication? This chapter will look at relevant political 
changes that might have led to detachment and euroscepticism of citizens in the decade of 2008 to 
2018. The EU’s communication is not primarily concerned with those citizens who passionately 
defend European integration. Rather, it aims to foster support from those who seem detached from 
the Union and from those who are openly against the project as a whole. Acknowledging this 
provides a basis for the following chapters which are dealing with the question of how EU-
institutions and their leaders can improve their connectivity with citizens living in this changed 
environment, which, in the end, constitutes an important tool for a vital democracy48.  
 
2.1. EU-interest and political participation  
According to Hilke Rebenstor: “a necessary precondition for the desired characteristics of a 
responsible and democratic citizen is: critical loyalty, ability and readiness for political 
participation”49. If this is true and political interest can be measured by the ability and readiness to 
participation, what can be said about the political participation in the 2008 - 2018 decade? Within 
this decade both Portuguese and German citizen reached a record-low level of political 
participation in the European Elections. While the voter turnout for the 2009 European Parliament 
                                                
47 David Easton. An approach to the analysis of Political Systems. The John Hopkins University, 1957: 386.  
48 John Hartley. Communication, Cultural and Media Studies - The key concepts. Routledge, 2002: 192. 
49 Hilke Rebenstorf. Political Interest - Its Meaning and General Development. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften: 
2004: 89. 
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elections in Germany reached 43,3 
percent, the second lowest turnout of 
any German election to the European 
parliament, Portuguese voters 
participated only with 36,8 percent, 
scoring their lowest EU participation 
in history. Although the rates 
changed only slightly in 2014, both 
countries experienced an opposite 
trend: While German voters 
participated slightly more with 47,9 percent, the 
Portuguese turnout even decreased to 33,8 percent, 
reaching the lowest turnout of any election in Portugal 
since the Portuguese revolution in 1974. As shown in 
graph [1] the chosen decade represents a low point in 
political participation since the accession of Portugal to 
the EC and the following extraordinary elections to the 
European Parliament in 1987(*). Moreover, both 
European elections falling into the given time frame 
show significant differences in the respective countries’ 
participation in comparison to their national 
parliamentary elections, as depicted in graphs [2] and 
[3]. According to Regina Quelhas Lima from the 
portuguese Jacques Delors Information Centre, this 
large discrepancy between participation on a national 
level and relatively low participation in the European 
Parliament is worrying.50 Citizens tend to have a much 
greater interest in their national politics than in EU 
affairs. But why? Some authors argue that citizens seem 
                                                
50 Regina Quelhas Lima. Interview at the Centro de Informação Jacques Delors. Direcção Geral dos Assuntos 
Europeus - Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros. Lisboa, Portugal, 11.4.2019.  
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to think that their vote is useless and unable to make a difference among 500 million European 
citizens51. Jason Brannen even goes one step beyond and argues that a political system incentivises 
this ‘ignorance’ by making it very costly to politically educate oneself in order to make a rightful 
decision or to vote at all.52  
What makes the case of the EU so unique is the fact that, for many citizens, ‘Brussels’ seems 
farther away from their daily lives then Berlin or Lisbon. This detachment already starts with the 
frequent use of the word “Brussels” to refer to the EU and its institutions. Whoever refers to the 
Belgian capital when talking about the EU also emphasises - consciously or unconsciously - the 
distance between his or her own national or local concern and European politics. German political 
scientist Swantje Lingenberg reminds that some people in Germany even refer to the EU as a 
“spaceship”53 The geographical and political distance a strong term like this implies, seems 
obvious. As we have seen in chapter 1, the EU has an impressive local and regional dimension 
which might be undermined and ignored by the use of such rhetoric. 
 
2.2. The role of the media  
Following Neidhardt, Eilders and Pfetsch54 it can be assumed that the media, especially through 
commentaries, have a strong influence on public opinion and thus on politics. Yet, the problem 
authors have distinguished when analysing the effect of media on the citizens’ perception of the 
EU, is the lack of a public European sphere.55 Koopmann even argues, that if one were to search 
for a “genuinely supranational public sphere on the European level, there is not much to be found.'' 
In any case, media - whether or not a European public sphere exists - is a fundamental platform to 




                                                
51 Juvenal Rodrigues. Umbilicalmente ligados à UE. dnoticias.pt. 27.2.2019. 
https://www.dnoticias.pt/opiniao/artigos/umbilicalmente-ligados-a-ue-KK4419927# (last accessed: 13.3.2019 / 
20:00). 
52 Jason Brennan. Against Democracy. Princeton University Press, 2016: 53.  
53 Note: German word: “Raumschiff”. 
54 Christiane Eilders; Friedhelm Neidhardt; Barbara Pfetsch. Die Stimme der Medien. Pressekommentare und 
politische Öffentlichkeit in der Bundesrepublik. Springer VS, 2004.  
55 Ruud Koopmans, 2004: 183-210.  
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2.2.1. Mass media         
Although current times are placing the spotlight on new media and social networks as the 
innovative ways of communicating politics, mass media is still a key player in shaping European 
citizens’ opinion.56 Koopmans even argues that “more even than on the national level, the 
communication flow between the European Union (EU) and other European-level institutions and 
the public depends on the mass media.”.57 In 2004 the author doubted the existence of any relevant 
European-wide mass media. In his view, the few attempts to establish a transnational mass media, 
like the daily journal The European, were unsuccessful or insignificant, like the TV channel 
Euronews or the weekly magazine European Voice.58 Many authors argue however, that this has 
changed since the 2010’s. All the three examples referred to by Koopmans in 2004, have, in a 
certain way regained their significance by 2018: after its disappearance in 1998, The European 
magazine was reborn in 2009 under the directorate of the German journalist Alexander Görlach. 
The European Voice was reorganised by a joint venture of the American Politico and the German 
Axel Springer SE culminating in the creation of Europe's own Politico magazine starting in 2015.59 
The last example referred to by Koopmans, the TV channel Euronews, gained, according to 
Ferrari, an “increased audience”60 in this decade. Ferrari states, that, by 2017, Euronews broadcasts 
24 hours a day, seven days a week, reaching about 400 million households.61 Koopmans argues, 
however, that although there are a variety of transnational media which are relatively successful, 
they “have a global rather than European profile.”62 
 
It is true that, by 2019, these broadcasters are far from enjoying the relevance national news 
channels and journals do. Since the beginning of the EEC and later the EU and despite the 
increasing integration of member states in the economic, monetary, legal and social fields, neither 
the pro-European newspapers nor public service broadcasters, with the notable exception of 
                                                
56 Niklewicz, 2017: 47. 
57 Koopmans, 2004: 184. 
58 idem: 185. 
59 Joe Pompeo. Politico acquires European Voice, details Europe venture. Politico [online], 12.10.2014. 
https://www. politico.com/media/story/2014/12/politico-acquires-european-voice-details-europe-venture-003198/ 
(last accessed: 20.4.2019 / 19:00).  
60 Anna Ferrari. Does a European Public Sphere exist? The new federalist, 27.2.2017. 
https://www.thenewfederalist.eu/does-a-european-public-sphere-exist (last accessed: 20.4.2019 / 19:00).  
61 Ferrari, 2017: 1. 
62 Koopmans, 2004: 185. 
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Euronews, have been able to create an EU-wide media landscape dedicated to the concerns of the 
EU. One could therefore argue that European media shares - to a certain extent - the responsibility 
of the decline of popular support for the European idea. Any conclusion based on the relevance of 
trans-European mass media on the EU’s communication without considering the national media, 
would therefore be incomplete. 
 
In Germany, European policy concerns certainly play a role in the press comments. Nonetheless, 
most papers are clearly focused on national and regional issues. A European perspective is 
predominantly seen in the national and regional context or regarding the failure of “Brussels” to 
solve pan-European structural issues such as the public deficit and debt - crisis or the immigration 
challenge. Here newspapers are quick to criticize the lack of a common European policy, although 
they themselves do not always live up to their own standards.  
An example for more radical and often eurosceptic reports is the German BILD Zeitung (BILD). 
Especially during the time of the eurozone crisis BILD was regularly criticised for its polarising, 
provocative and sometimes even offensive rhetoric towards the EU and countries like Greece63. 
Until today, Germany's biggest boulevard paper regularly emphasises a disproportionality of 
German contributions to “Brussels.”64 65 
Nonetheless and apart from the example of BILD, the project of European integration is generally 
rated positively by a great share of the German mass media. The emphasis lies, however, mostly 
more on the economic aspects of European integration. For example, one of the leading German 
papers, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), understands the European model of freedom 
and success above all in an economic sense.66 Another quality paper, Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ), 
regularly emphasizes that the EU is not just a free market, but also a community of values.67 
                                                
63 Anne Fromm. Griechenlandberichterstattung der “Bild”: Nationalistisch und Einseitig. TAZ [online], 24.3.2015: 
1. http://www.taz.de/Griechenlandberichterstattung-der-Bild/!5015409/ ((last accessed: 20.4.2019 / 12:00). 
64 Note: How BILD often refers to the EU. 
65 Bild Online. Neuer EU-Haushalt: Deutschland soll 15 Mrd. mehr an Brüssel zahlen. Bild Online, 22.10.2018: 1. 
https://www.bild.de/politik/inland/politik-inland/neuer-eu-haushalt-deutschland-soll-15-mrd-mehr-an-bruessel-
zahlen-57980164.bild.html (last accessed: 20.4.2019 / 18:00). 
66 See: Christian Geinitz. Streit in Europa: Die EU sollte dem aufmüpfigen Osten zuhören. Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung [online], 8.5.2019. https://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/wie-es-um-die-neuen-eu-mitglieder -im-jahr-
2019-steht-16175642.html (last accessed: 20.4.19 / 19:00).  
67 Matthias Kolb. Das Fundament der EU ist bedroht. Süddeutsche Zeitung [online], 9.4.2019. 
https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/eu-ungarn-polen-1.4400889 (last accessed: 20.4.2019 / 19:00).  
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However, the German communication scientist Kramp criticises the fact that newspapers did not 
achieve to convey their readers the regional and local relevance that the EU has.68 
 
In the Portuguese media, European issues have also been at the center of attention in the last 
decade. Since 1974, the perspective of Membership has been of vital importance to Portugal. 
According to Teresa de Sousa and Carlos Gaspar, since its outset in the 70's, Portuguese democracy 
was inseparable from the EU.69 The approach of mainstream media has been, accordingly, 
relatively pro-European, with extensive coverage of the generous treatment given by the European 
Community to Portugal, appreciation of the cooperation with European institutions and schemes. 
This includes co-financing of projects and structural improvement, seen as decisively enhancing 
the economic and social development of the country.70 It is important to understand the particular 
position of the opinion makers in Portugal. With the establishment of democracy, there was a fresh 
start of the written press, with the edition of only a few national daily or weekly newspapers, non-
ideological, pluralist, and with a broadly pro-European editorial line. José Paquete de Oliveira 
observes that, with the exception of the so called revolutionary period, there are no newspapers 
with left or right tendencies, like in other European countries.71 Their commercial strategy is aimed 
at capturing the widest plural audience.72 According to the above mentioned authors,73 the 
confidence in Europe was unbroken until the two crises after 2008. Especially during the economic 
austerity program, between 2011 and 2014, a differentiated reporting expressed also the critical 
views of the opponents of economic and social reforms and voiced the social costs of the so-called 
Troika programme.74 Like in previous pre-accession debt crisis, governments led by the leading 
parties PS or PSD, invested in complying with the pains of reform and attained the established 
                                                
68 Leif Kramp. In René Martens. EU-Berichterstattung. Sind Medien am schlechten Image der EU schuld? 
Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk. 360G, [online], 24.5.2019. https://www.mdr.de/medien360g/medienpolitik /europa-
journalismus-berichterstattung-100.html (last accessed: 30.6.2019 / 18:00).  
69 Teresa de Sousa; Carlos Gaspar. Portugal, the European Union and the Crisis. Portugal and Europe. Relações 
Internacionais. Special Issue, 2018: 1 ff. 
70 Exame, 2015: 1 ff; Graça Andrade Ramos. Relançar a Europa 60 anos depois. RTP Notícias [online], 25.5.2017. 
https://www.rtp.pt/noticias/mundo/relancar-a-europa-60-anos-depois_es990975 (last accessed: 20.4.19 / 20:00). 
71 José Manuel Paquete de Oliveira. Não há jornais de direita nem de esquerda em Portugal. Público [online]. 
6.6.2016 
https://www.publico.pt/2016/06/06/sociedade/opiniao/nao-ha-jornais-de-direita-nem-de-esquerda-em-portugal-
1734159 (last accessed: 20.4.19 / 20:00). 
72  José Manuel Paquete de Oliveira, 2016: 1.  
73 Teresa de Sousa; Carlos Gaspar, 2018: 1 ff. 
74 Alexandre Abreu, Hugo Mendes. A Crise a Troika e as Alternativas Urgentes. Tinta da China, 2013: 1 ff.  
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aims with the general support of the citizens, having recently been congratulated for this attitude 
by Mario Draghi.75 
  
The weekly Expresso76 positioned itself from the outset as a democratic-social-liberal quality 
paper. The daily Público77 assumes an expressly pro-European line and invests in profound news 
coverage and research. In fact, the Público describes itself in its editorial notice, as a 
“Europeanist”78 journal. The weekly Sol79 follows a similar line. These papers try to invest in 
quality and responsible journalism. Correio da Manhã80 is the leading tabloid, with just over 
150.000 copies and 40 percent of the daily circulation.81 It has a general scope, with popular and 
investigative news. There are also other popular dailies, focused on sports, Bola and Record. 
TV also plays an important role in the EU-perception of portuguese citizens. According to the 
Eurobarometer 90, the main source of information on European issues in Portugal is the TV, 
referred to by 81 percent of the inquired, 9 percent above the EU average. After the TV, the main 
sources are the written media, referred to by 35 percent, followed by radio and websites in a similar 
position, with 28 percent.82  
To conclude, the study from Horta from 2010,83 after analysing the four main newspapers, 
Eurobarometer and assessing interviews with citizens of different education, defends that there is 
a broad correspondence between the representation of the EU conveyed by Portuguese newspapers 
and the public opinion in the country.  
 
                                                
75 Jornal de Negócios. Draghi: Portugal está no caminho do crescimento e é símbolo da integração europeia. 
[online] Lusa, 19.6.2019. https://www.jornaldenegocios.pt/economia/europa/detalhe/draghi-portugal-esta-no-
caminho- do-crescimento-e-e-simbolo-da-integracao-europeia (last accessed: 10.6.2019 / 23:00). 
76  Note: Founded in 1973. 
77  Note: Founded in 1990. 
78  Manuel Carvalho; Amílcar Correia; Ana Sá Lopes; David Pontes; Tiago Luz Pedro. Os compromissos da 
Direcção Editorial. Público [online]. 16.8.2018, 2018. https://www.publico.pt/2018/08/16/opiniao/noticia/os-
compromissos -da-direccao-editorial-1841144 (last accessed: 10.6.2019 / 23:00). 
79 Note: Founded in 2006. 
80 Note: Founded in 1979. 
81 OberCom. A Imprensa em Portugal. Setembro 2014.  [online] 2014: 5. https://obercom.pt/wp-
content/uploads/2016/ 06/A-Imprensa-em-Portugal-–-Performances-e-indicadores-de-gestão-consumo-procura-e-
distribuição-–-Set2014.pdf (last accessed: 13.5.2019 / 12:30). 
82 Eurobarómetro Standard 90. Portugal, Relatório Nacional, Outono 2018. Opinião pública na União Europeia, 
2018: 12-13. 
83 Ana Horta. Representações sobre a UE: da informação mediática à opinião pública. Instituto de Ciências Sociais 
da Universidade de Lisboa, 2010: 477 - 486. 
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2.2.2. New media  
The decade under consideration has seen another major development: A technological shift. While 
in 2008 only 60 percent of all EU citizens frequently used the internet, this number increased to 
85 percent ten years later. As graph [4] depicts, citizens of all ages both in Germany and Portugal 
have had a strong increase of 
internet usage during the ten-
year-period. With the internet 
on the rise in Europe, a large 
share of social media platforms 
such as Facebook (est. 2004), 
YouTube (est. 2005), Twitter 
(est. 2006), WhatsApp (est. 
2009) or Instagram (est. 2010) 
where launched just in the 
beginning of the period we are 
focusing on. This means that 2008-2018 was a time when most of the social media platforms and 
services we know today played an increasing role in our daily lives. By 2017, 54 percent of the 16 
to 74 year old Europeans84 participated in social media platforms.85 This development is 
accompanied by a whole new dimension of social interactions and political communication while 
at the same time citizens - especially the younger generation - increasingly tend to rely on 
information obtained through social media.86 According to Niklewicz, particularly the age group 
of 18 to 29 acknowledge social media as their primary source of information.87 This dramatic 
increase of social media on people’s lives including the threats, risk and opportunities this 
technological progress brings with it, should be considered by policy makers in order to improve 
their communication. So let us take a closer look on these risks: it was the pope Francis who stated 
that social media is “most exposed to disinformation and to the conscious and targeted distortion 
                                                
84 Note: EU-28 population. 
85 European Union. Key Figures on Europe - 2018 edition, 2018: 29 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3217494/9309359/KS-EI-18-001-EN-N.pdf/0b8d8b94-541d-4d0c-b6a4-
31a1f9939a75 (last accessed: 22.3.2019 / 17:00). 
86 Niklewicz, 2017: 13. 
87 idem. 
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of facts and interpersonal relationships.”88 Which are the lessons we can learn for political 
communication? In the following,  I am distinguishing three major effects of social media and their 
effect on the European political communication: 
 
- First, the way we consume media and politics. The way citizens inform and consume news 
and politics has changed significantly according to Jamie Bartlett. In his “The People vs 
Tech”, Bartlett argues that, although the internet brings many benefits for citizens, it turns 
political culture anarchic: social media platforms, according to the author, give citizens an 
“endless, rapid flow of dissonant ideas and arguments”89 without any structure or logical 
order. “Modern citizen is expected to sift through an insane torrent of competing facts, 
networks, friend requests, blogs, data propaganda, misinformation, investigative 
journalism, charts, different charts, commentary and reportage.” One main implication of 
this development is the change from a “win-the-day” mentality to a “win-the-minute” 
mentality of politicians involved in any discourse. Potential voters or citizens have to 
constantly be won and convinced because of the rapidness of information flows in social 
media and the internet.  
- Second, the distortion of content. The rise of rapid, distorted, corrupt, non fact-based, 
anonymous or radical information, propaganda or content in social media posts, uploads, 
pictures, videos etc. is alarming. For Niklewicz it is preoccupying to see that social media 
platforms, unlike the conventional media and its media organizations, have no mechanism 
to decide whether certain ideas are too radical to be discussed publicly “since there are no 
gatekeepers”.90  
- Third, the creation of ‘filter bubbles’ and ‘echo-chambers’. It is the idea that social media 
platforms create certain ‘filter bubbles’ which often represent a very specific group of 
people with a specific background. These bubbles create ‘echo chambers’ of opinions by 
strengthening existing points of view without providing a lot of space for new political 
                                                
88 Pope Francis. In Lydia O’Kane. Pope highlights pros and cons of internet and social media use. Vatican news, 
2019. https://www.vaticannews.va/en/pope/news/2019-01/pope-highlights-pros-and-cons-of-internet-and-social-
media-use.html (last accessed: 10.6.2019 / 23:00). 
89Jamie Bartlett. The People vs Tech - How the internet is killing democracy (and how we save it). Penguin Random 
House Groupe, 2008: 53. 
90 Niklewicz (2017) p.10. 
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ideas or debates.91 A good example is twitter which is used extensively by journalists and 
politicians. A journalist that gathers information for coverage would, according to the 
concept of echo chambers, rather reflect opinions produced by other journalists and 
politicians then reflecting citizens’ opinion on certain aspects of political life. For political 
communication it is therefore crucial to consider which social media platform or tool has 
the ability to reach which group of people and which groups would be left out by only 
focusing on certain platforms.  
 
What does this mean for the EU’s communication? In order to be successful in reaching out to its 
citizens, institutions have to incorporate answers in their communication strategies corresponding 
to an increasing ‘social medialisation’ of political communication. By being active on a variety of 
social media platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, Youtube and Twitter, institutions may reach 
more citizens, including those who tend to be indifferent or hostile to EU subjects: Niklewicz 
recommends the EU should “gradually shift their focus from the old media to their new online 
counterpart, and especially social platforms”, without losing the connection to conventional media 
like TV and newspapers, which are still fundamental to foster awareness for some citizens. 
Campaigns have to constantly adapt and evaluate the fast-changing trends in user behaviour92. This 
user behaviour may lead to shifts of the importance of certain social media platforms but also in 
the content engaged. Niklewicz predicts that from 2015 to 2020 the consumption of video content 
“will move from accounting 64% of all the internet traffic to more than 82%. This clearly suggests 
which type of online content should be prioritised in the internet”.93 Schrötter, however, argues 
that, although online campaigns are efficient tools to reach younger citizens, they often lack the 
ability to sensibilize viewers for the greater contexts and structures.94 Any successful “instruction” 
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92 Niklewicz, 2017: 47. 
93 idem. 
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2.3. Drivers for euroscepticism  
For authors like FitzGibbon, Leruth and Startin,95 euroscepticism as an opposition to the increase 
of power of the EU96 had first emerged as a purely British phenomena in the 1980’s.97 Considering 
the EU-wide appearance of euroscepticism, the authors have no doubt that it was the Treaty of 
Maastricht which represented a “key turning point”.98 What had been the European Community 
for many years now became the European Union. And what might have been just a symbolic act 
for some, marks a turning point for Usherwood and Startin: “The moment when divisions between 
European and domestic policy begin to become increasingly blurred in the areas of political, 
economic, social, legal, environmental and foreign affairs”.99 In the following years, 
euroscepticism would become a regular factor in almost every field of EU politics. A peak was 
reached with the negative turnout of the Dutch and French referenda on a possible European 
constitution in 2005, which led the EU to officially recognize that its “connection with citizens 
had been severed”.100 Braga da Cruz argues that these referenda are good examples for the fact 
that Europe has been excessively built by it’s political elites without taking enough consideration 
of its citizens.101 This leads to a decreasing EU-affiliation and interest of citizens. What followed 
these referenda was a period of consecutive economic and political crisis contributing not only to 
a short termed euroscepticism but also to the mid to long term establishment of populist parties 
from both the radical left and right. This period also laid the ground - inter alia - for the Brexit-
referendum which led to the first country ever leaving the EU.102  
 
What are the main drivers for possible EU-scepticism of citizens and why was the decade under 
consideration so fundamental in shaping the EU’s political environment? To answer this, we will 
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consider the two major political crisis between 2008 and 2018 as well as the rise of populism and 




The decade of 2008 to 2018 will most likely be associated with a variety of economic and political 
crisis in European history books. Within these ten years major political and economical crisis have 
shaken up the fundament of the organization: The financial crisis of 2008 which, according to the 
European Commission “hit Europe hard”103 and was followed by the public-debt crisis in Greece 
as well as economic recessions in several European countries; The annexation of Crimea followed 
by the military conflict in eastern Ukraine, the doorsteps of the EU constituted a huge challenge to 
the EU’s common foreign and security policy; The migration crisis with millions of refugees 
fleeing from wars in Syria and Afghanistan together with other migrants from the Middle East and 
Africa seeking a new life in Europe put a strain on solidarity of member states. And, of course, the 
Great Britain’s vote to leave the European Union raised questions and doubts as to the sustainable 
coherence of the Union. 
 
Especially the eurozone crisis and the migration crisis did not only have an impact in the lives of 
many Europeans but consequently on the way they perceive the EU and politics in general. Both 
crisis exemplify contrast of citizens expectations about the EU’s ability and readiness to cope with 
crisis and how the EU responded to the crisis in reality.104  
 
Let us start considering the crisis of the eurozone. Following the international financial crisis of 
2008 and the collapse of Lehman Brothers on September 15 in 2008, the so-called “eurozone 
crisis” hit several European countries hard. EU members such as Greece, Portugal, Ireland or Spain 
faced severe difficulties or were unable to pay back their state debts without the interference of 
third parties, such as the EU member states, the International Monetary Fund or the European 
Central Bank. Although Portugal was one of the countries that made strong efforts to regain its 
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financial autonomy, and consequently managed to exit the so called Troika Programme in May 
2014, citizens' opinions about the crisis management competence of the EU institutions in these 
turbulent economic times suffered: a comparison of the citizens’ trust in the European Union, 
before and after the outbreak of the crisis, show a clear trend: while 58 percent of the portuguese 
tended to trust the EU in early 2008105 this number would shrink to 44 percent in 2011106 and even 
reach only 28 percent in 2014,107 the year when the Troika left the country. These figures speak 
for themselves: the EU’s image in Portugal has been damaged throughout the eurozone crisis.  
 
The second crisis worth taking a look at is the refugee crisis. Mainly caused by different kinds of 
interstate wars, civil wars or terrorism as in Syria, Afghanistan or Iraq or due to economic misery 
and political persecution. It resulted in a significant increase of refugees and migrants coming to 
Europe having 2015 as a peak year. One year after the start of this crisis a large share of German 
citizens had the impression that the EU did not provide efficient solutions, a situation which 
accelerated euroscepticism in the country.108 While some authors criticised the EU’s inability to 
distribute refugees and migrants among member states109 other observers argue that the EU did 
not manage to protect its external borders.110 Although some countries like Portugal clearly 
expressed their willingness to apply the EU’s Dublin Regulations,111 the overall lack of compliance 
of the Dublin Regulations contributed towards eurosceptic tendencies in the whole of the EU and 
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especially in Germany.112 This eventually led to a similar impression citizens had after the 
eurozone crisis: the EU institutions were not seen as efficient and fast in their crisis reaction and 
management as the citizens expected, while, on the other hand, they were bound by the decision 
making of the European Council, representing the lowest common denominator of 28 countries. 
A communicational trap, that had a negative effect on the EU’s image.  
The graph [5] shows how the two 
above mentioned crisis affected 
the overall trust of citizens in the 
EU. Both countries in 
consideration experienced 
significant decreases in their trust 
to the EU. The variability of the 
trust to the organization shown by 
German and Portuguese citizens 
can be seen in Graph [6]. 
Although the EU’s reputation in 
both countries suffered from both 
crises, citizens trust in Portugal 
decreased especially in the 
aftermath of the eurozone crisis, 
while the German trust shrank 
after the outbreak of the refugee 
crisis. At the end of the 2008 - 
2018 decade trust levels both in Germany and in Portugal regained strength.  
A possible interpretation of this given data could be that citizens trust both in Germany, Portugal 
and EU-wide correlates with the performance of the EU during crisis times. Germany and Portugal 
clearly highlight that citizens in member states can be economically or socially affected for 
different reasons. Acknowledging this correlation as well as citizens’ fears of future crisis would 
                                                
112 Jenz Jacobsen. Europäische Union: Der Skandal heißt Dublin. Zeit Online, 23.3.2017. 
https://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2017-03/europaeische-union-asylpolitik-fluechtlinge-griechenland-dublin-
vertraege (last accessed: 3.4.2019 /17:00).  
33 
be a first obligation for the EU’s communication departments. But, as we have seen, the crisis may 
often be a result from the lack of competences attributed to the EU institutions themselves. To 
openly communicate this paradox and to make citizens aware of the constraints of 
intergovernmental cooperation at the EU level during crisis compared to unilateral approaches 
could eventually be a way to manage future image-crisis. It would also be a way to confront, and 
possibly contain, populist euroscepticism through communication. 
 
2.3.2. The rise of populism  
The decade of 2008-2018 paved the way for a rise of political parties representing populist and 
often openly anti-European positions.  
How did these parties and movements affect the EU’s relation to its citizens? A considerable 
number of EU member states such as France, Italy, Austria, the Netherlands, Sweden, Poland, 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Slovakia, Spain, Great Britain or Germany have experienced 
boosts of populist parties. Of course, populist positions of the right and the left of the political 
spectrum have different ideological backgrounds. Yet, authors like Eiermann, Mounk and Gultchin 
argue that it were especially the previously discussed European crisis that united these parties113: 
“ twin legacies of the Eurozone crisis and mass migration have increasingly challenged the rigid 
distinction between them.”114 Both the German and Portuguese reality allow us to depict two 
different types of anti-European tendencies that have increasingly made their way into public 
opinion: the far-left and far-right populism.  
 
Firstly, the far-left populism has experienced some increases in support in the aftermath of the 
eurozone crisis in Portugal: while voters of the Bloco de Esquerda (BE) and Coligação 
Democrática Unitária (CDU) only reached a total of 13,89 percent115 in the 2005 Portuguese 
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legislative elections,116 this number would reach 18,44 percent117 in 2015 - after the outbreak of 
the refugee and migration crisis.    
Both parties have in some cases won decisive support because of their promise to hold financial 
markets accountable for the recession which broke out in several EU countries. Although the 
Portuguese Bloco da Esquerda (BE), the Partido Comunista Português (PCP) and the German Die 
LINKE are parties which were founded before the outbreak of the European financial and debt 
crisis, they all aim at projecting potential worries and fears of citizens related to the eurozone crisis 
into concrete anti-European positions. 
 
In the case of both BE and PCP, euroscepticism and anti-europeanism is often incentivised by 
blaming “Brussels” and other member states’ governments to impose measures on their own 
country: while BE, in its programme for the portuguese legislative elections of 2015, directly refers 
to the EU adjustment programmes as the “criteria of Merkel”118 and argues that in the EU, “Berlin” 
and it’s dictations are the only rules,119 PCP argues that the EU submisses Portugal to its own 
interests and consequently opposes the forces who “rule”120 the organization. The BE also sees a 
real dilemma in the “impossibility”121 of the Portuguese public to control its own banking system, 
its own industries and the labour market, without disobeying EU institutions “in the name of 
sovereignty.”122  
The German case of the far-left Die LINKE shows that the aftermath of the eurozone crisis is used 
to incentivise eurosceptic tendencies by turning the spotlight on the “wrong neoliberal 
orientation”123 of the EU since the Treaty of Maastricht124. This reconfirms the theory, previously 
mentioned of FitzGibbon, Leruth and Startin, that Maastricht represents a major turning point of 
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increasing euroscepticism.125 Interesting, however, is the fact that Die LINKE also sees a problem 
in economically stronger performing countries taking the lead in the EU, thus blaming Germany 
for ruling over other EU states. The case of Die LINKE also shows that the refugee crisis may 
represent a further reason for far-left parties to foster euroscepticism among citizens, seeing that, 
according to this party, the EU has failed to prevent thousands of deaths in the Mediterranean 
Sea.126 This euroscepticism of Die LINKE might at some stage even turn into full scale anti 
europeanism, as leading politicians like Sarah Wagenknecht demonstrated, by stating that the EU 
is a “handle to destroy democracy.”127  
 
Secondly, there has been a remarkable increase of far-right populist parties in the period of 2008 
to 2018. As regards this phenomenon, there is a decisive difference between both countries: 
Portugal has not seen any relevant increase of such far-right populism during the given time. 
Moreover the highest performing far-right party in the country, Partido Nacional Renovador (PNR) 
scored its highest support of any country-wide election between 2008 and 2018 attracting merely 
0,5 percent of the votes in the legislative elections of 2015,128 which makes it unnecessary to 
consider a possible partisan influence of the far-right on Portuguese citizens. 
In Germany, the entrance of the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) into the political 
sphere has shaped the political discourse in the country during the years in focus. The AfD was 
founded in the aftermath of the eurozone crisis129 and gained an essential boost with the outbreak 
of the refugee crisis in Germany.130 How does the party see the EU? According to Lehne, radical-
right populism is inevitably connected to euroscepticism “because it is inherently against the idea 
of supranational authority that overrides the will of the people."131 From this point of view, it is 
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not surprising that the AfD often criticizes the EU by resorting to the image of an ever growing 
“superstate”.132 The AfD considers the EU to be an “undemocratic construction”; “occupied by 
European political actors” who make politics in an “intransparent” and “uncontrollably 
bureaucratic”133 way. It also warned citizens in its electoral programme for the German elections 
of 2017 that the EU will, in the long run, “destroy national states”134 in their entirety. Moreover, 
the AfD considers any further European integration to be inevitably unsuccessful because, 
according to the party’s programme, there is no way Europe could ever claim to have a united 
people.135 This rather negative image of the EU was supported by an increasing number of German 
citizens: although the AFD did not manage to enter the German Bundestag in the 2013 elections136 
it successfully managed to enter all the parliaments of the 16 federal states of Germany by 2018137 
and, in 2017 was voted into the Bundestag with 12,6 percent.138 Of course one can argue that the 
main reason for the support of the AfD was not necessarily its EU-programme but rather its 
position to the refugee crisis which affected Germany. However, a party representing such a 
percentage of the German population139 constituting the main opposition in the Bundestag, 
definitely has an impact on the political discourse in the country.  
 
Which are the lessons to be learned? The rise of populist tendencies may have its roots in the 
sentiment of parts of the population of feeling overruled, not heard and left-out by the so called 
European elites developed in the aftermath of the depicted European crisis. To fix this relationship 
and lack of trust, the EU’s political elites will have no other choice as to take into account the 
programmes of EU-opposing parties, analysing the development and crisis that helped them grow 
in order not to lose a considerable share of citizens.  
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Having said that the Union will need to adjust the way it communicates to citizens in order to 
tackle the criticism, that it only serves a small group of ‘elites’, Lehne argues, that the EU has to 
“become stronger in defending its core project and more flexible in adjusting to new ways of doing 
politics. To do this, the Union has to engage citizens directly, refocus on their legitimate 
grievances, and strengthen the consensus around its values base."140 Also, in “the face of political 
turmoil and public anger”141 the EU will not be successful by only relying on a technical approach 
in communication. Instead, it needs a new approach in communicating with citizens 
convincingly.142 Understanding the cases of far-left to far-right populist parties emphasising 
euroscepticism in different realities such as Germany and Portugal may be crucial for the EU and 
its leaders to strengthen political communication. 
 
2.3.3. Uniformization and the lack of European identity 
Examining possible reasons for citizens’ discontent concerning European integration may not 
exclude the dimension of identity. A potential lack of European identity among citizens and, at the 
same time, an increase of political, economic and cultural uniformization are often target of 
criticism. Scholars debating this aspect on a European level generally have two main concerns. 
First, the assumption that there is no such thing as a common European identity among citizens 
from Helsinki to Lisbon. Second, the assumption that European integration may progressively 
promote uniformity among member states without really protecting the kind of plurality which 
could be crucial for its political survival.  
 
In either way, both aspects are closely linked to each other and scholars rarely examined uniformity 
without considering the lack of European identity. However, there is a crucial difference between 
studies conducted around the turn of the century and studies conducted around the 2010’s. 
At the turn of the century scholars were influenced by the fast moving integration process which 
expressed itself through the ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht, the Treaty of Amsterdam, the 
birth of the Euro, the 2004 enlargement and the debates about a possible European Constitution. 
This contributed to the fact that authors were at the same time divided between “the proponents of 
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a federal Europe and those of an intergovernmentalist one.”143 For Goldman, this debate emerged 
due to the increasing use of the “European Nation-State”144 as an image for possible future EU 
developments.145 Cedermann also argued in 2001, that “there cannot be a European identity in the 
singular but only a plurality of European identities that will clash and reconstruct one another in 
the process that is identity politics”.146 The debate on creating a Nation-State was clearly too 
radical and progressive for many authors and started a wave of criticism. 
 
In the 2010’s, the academic debate changed slightly due to a certain slowdown of the process of 
European integration. With its last major reform in the form of the Lisbon Treaty in 2007, the EU 
has experienced rather modest steps of integration and, with the accession of Bulgaria, Romania 
and Croatia, between 2008 and 2018 the pace of enlargement was reduced. As the Economist 
argues,  
“the decade of living dangerously seems to have shaped European politics into 
something a bit more cohesive if not coherent. Europe is no longer in the business 
of expansion or of integration come what may. It is in the business of protection.”147 
This development led to the replacement of a more nation-state based paradigm in debates by the 
question of whether it is the impossibility to achieve a European identity among citizens that stops 
the EU from further integrating. In 2015, Espada defended that pluralism is indispensable for the 
EU to survive and that monistic approaches would eventually lead to the “destruction”148 of the 
European project.149  
 
Publications of both decades, the 2000’s and 2010’s, tend to agree that European identity is only 
possible through pluralism of different identities. A “mosaic of nation states of widely varying size 
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and boasting different languages, cultures, histories and temperaments”150 as the Economist 
argues, is fundamentally hindered by the lack of a European people.151 Yet, a potential tendency 
of European integration to merge several aspects of the society, might only be mirroring a global 
development on the macro level. Brown argues, that it is the whole process of globalization that 
“potentially creates a uniform world with global production and consumption patterns gradually 
ironing out the differences between peoples and societies.”152 Also, the EU institutions must be 
aware of the important role nation States play. As Münkler argued, an “EU without a nation-state 
substructure would be a house built on the quicksand of globalisation.”153  
 
Several ambitious projects of the EU institutions such as the creation of Erasmus+, co-financing 
Interrail-tickets, introducing several symbols like the European anthem, flagg or a new slogan 
might have attracted a certain generation of Europeans extensively profiting from the freedom of 
movement and somehow feeling more European than their own nationality. But the 
Eurobarometers154 shows: these people are in a minority.  
 
As shown in graph [7], 
only 2 percent of the 
interviewed consider 
themselves exclusively 
European and 6 percent 
European in the first 
place with their home 
countries nationality in 
second place. A majority of 55 percent define themselves as having their home countries 
nationality in the first place and being European in second place, while 35 percent see themselves 
as exclusively having their countries nationality.  
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These numbers of spring 2018 show that the EU is far away from the idea of a genuinely, 
majoritarian European Identity. If EU institutions and leaders aim to foster a progressive and 
constant uniformization of societies they must be aware of these numbers and the mentioned 
studies. And they must take into account that such a development could be seen as adding fuel to 
the fire. A fire which can strongly contribute to an increase of euroscepticism and anti-
Europeanism.  
 
What lessons could be taken for the EU’s communication in this field? It seems clear that not 
everyone between the Azores and the Baltics feel as European as young Erasmus+ academics 
might suggest. The 2018 numbers have shown that a total of 90 percent155 of citizens in Europe do 
not feel European in the first place. The EU should therefore communicate accordingly. 
Institutions and their campaigns should give special attention to the specific countries and regions 
where the potential recipients of their messages live while avoiding the exhaustive use of a EU-
uniformal approach. This does not mean the EU should not communicate as a EU, but it should, 
however, respect the fact that the citizens it wants to reach are somewhere else then in the European 
sphere. A possible way of achieving this would be by making use of practical country specific 
examples and by employing means of storytelling to reach citizens in their local sphere.156   
 
2.3.4. The role of national governments  
Lastly, we have to consider actors who also have a strong influence on the way citizens view the 
EU: national governments. We are arriving at a real dilemma: The plurality of representations and 
interests of European leaders. Although leaders of both Germany and Portugal have proven to 
constantly defend pro-European attitudes and often even expressed their will for further integration 
of the EU, it seems logical that, due to the need of being re-elected and due to the national 
responsibility they hold, that their national reputation would rank higher than that of the EU. This 
very logic significantly challenges EU communication, seeing EU achievements and successes are 
often presented as achievements of the governing coalition in capitals. A look at the practice of 
many members of the European Council exemplifies this communicational challenge: all too often 
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ministers of the member states, which integrate the Council, do not communicate their 
achievements primarily in the name of the Council. Instead, ministers and prime ministers often 
return to their countries presenting Council achievements as their own.157 Barroso provides an 
example of his practical experience as President of the Commission: “Whenever the Council had 
reached an agreement, you were able to hear the sentence ‘I have reached this for my country’ in 
23 different languages. Whenever there was no agreement reached, it was due to the incompetence 
of the European Union.”158 Valentini and Nesti believe that one main reason for this “self-praise” 
of national leaders is, that the Council meets behind closed doors. This makes it possible for 
governments to “cheat” about the policies they pursue in Brussels, using the EU as a scapegoat for 
everything that went wrong in Europe while claiming all the benefits or the national 
government.”159  
Laura Shields, who works as an advisor for leading European policy makers, has introduced a term 
for this phenomenon: “EU-blaming”,160 going further than just avoiding communication about 
possible EU-related achievements. It means, that countries’ representatives blame the EU for 
missfunction and ineffectiveness. According to Shields, a scapegoat is created for national 
problems for which governments hold the EU accountable for.161 
This paradoxon of the communication of national leader shows that EU institutions have to 
acknowledge that member states’ representatives, although basically pro-european, as in the case 
of both countries considered, have a high interest in awarding potential EU-victories as their own. 
According to EU Regulation No 1303/2013162 member states, together with EU institutions are 
responsible for communicating EU benefits to citizens. Currently member states do not seem to 
live up to this responsibility. 
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3. The EU as political communicator  
We have seen the concrete impact the EU has on its citizens through funding. We have also seen 
how political circumstances affecting EU institutions and its citizens changed between 2008 and 
2018. After considering the theory on political communication and its relevance for political 
science, this chapter will examine the communication activities of the European Commission, the 
European Parliament and other institutions including the European Council and the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) in a changed environment. Seeing the study’s design is cross-sectional and 
it aims at giving recommendations on the basis of the recent communication efforts of the EU, we 
are considering campaigns running between may 2018 and may 2019.163 This enables us to 
examine campaigns in the wake of the 2019 European Elections. Knowing how the EU’s 
institutions reach out to the citizens in practice permits us to evaluate these actions and provide 
recommendations on how the EU can improve. 
 
3. 1. Theoretical background: Political communication 
What is political communication and how does it work in theory? Etymology might give us first 
clues. The word communication derives from the latin word “communis”, meaning the common 
or the public.164 Similarly, the word politics has its roots in the latin word “polis”, referring to a 
state or the community as a whole.165 Both terms are referring the general public and the 
community. Political communication scientist Brian McNair argues that everyone dealing with 
political communication should “begin by acknowledging that the term has proved to be 
notoriously difficult to define with any precision, simply because both components of the phrase 
are themselves open to a variety of definitions, more or less broad.”166 Problems concerning this 
matter could be seen from a political science, communication science or sociological perspective. 
In this study we are considering the political science approach. The concept of Graber and Smith 
strikes me to be one which includes many facets of a very diffuse field of study:  
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“The field of political communication (...) encompasses the construction, sending, 
receiving and processing messages that potentially have a significant direct or 
indirect impact on politics. (...) The key element is that the message has a significant 
political effect on the thinking, beliefs, and behaviours of individuals, groups, 
institutions, and whole societies and the environments in which they exist.”167 
 
Graber and Smith define the scope of possible functions of political communication for the actors 
involved. Due to the key elements provided, this definition is particularly interesting from the EU 
point of view: Following the authors argumentation, political communication aims at influencing 
thinking, beliefs and behaviour of citizens. Applied to the EU, this would mean that EU 
communication professionals produce communication policies to achieve a direct impact on EU 
citizens’ minds and opinions. And what impact would be more favourable than an increasing 
support for European integration among citizens as a counterbalance to increasing eurosceptic 
opinions?168 
 
So how can political communication influentiate the citizens’ opinion? For Donges and Jarren the 
answer is political public relations (political PR).169 The authors argue that actors in political PR 
pursue their goals intentionally, they conduct their PR by themselves, or - more commonly - 
through their political organization and their own specialised staff e.g. spokesmen or women and 
PR-consultants. One of the main functions of political PR according to Donges and Jarren is to 
identify “zones of uncertainty” as well as allocating resources for “informational solutions” - if 
necessary - by including affected citizens and associations within the specific phases of the 
political process.170 A good example for this would be the European Parliament’s invitation of 16 
year old climate activist Greta Thunberg.171 
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Another method to pursue successful communication in politics is the concept of political Media 
Relations (MR):172 A systematic, planned, intentional and mutual relation between journalists, 
mass media and political PR actors.173 The aim of this relation is to establish trust, comprehension 
and respect for both groups.174 From an EU-point-of-view, this relation is both important and 
particular. As an intergovernmental organization the EU has to primarily address the media on a 
national level. This is where this relation gets delicate: National Media, tend to have a greater 
interest for topics which are considered to be closer to the people.175 Following a clear rationale: 
national politics over European. 
 
Besides MR there are other ways for political actors like EU representatives to convey messages 
which might eventually foster support: While political PR promotes public interest exclusively 
through self-projection,176 there is also a type of political marketing, which includes non-personal 
and sometimes paid marketing means. The latter is often referred to as political advertisement.177 
Political advertisement operates with means known from the business world, such as a product and 
image advertisement and aims at creating a certain PR - outcome in the short term as well as an 
image improvement on the long term. Yet, for McNair, one “fundamental weakness” of political 
advertisement, is the fact that its message “is perceived as being, if not necessarily ‘propaganda’ 
(in the negative sense of that term), then ‘biased’ and partial.”178  
 
This perception produces the risk that receivers might develop a tendency to be distant from the 
sending entity, eventually even refusing it, because they know the message is “committed.”179 
Although McNair believes that this is the reason why the “effectiveness of political advertising as 
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a means of persuasion will always be limited”180, he acknowledges the increasingly important role 
it plays in the political process.  
 
Another form of political communication relevant for the EU is a ‘hybrid’-form, between political 
PR and political advertisement: the use of what McNair refers to as “free media”181 is categorised 
as a type of media through which political actors can achieve public coverage without having to 
pay for it.182 However, there are cost worthy exceptions within the free media: Digital agents that 
are accessible free of charge and offer possibilities to enhance the degree of the message’s range 
in return of payment. Best examples are the social media platforms Instagram or Facebook which 
offer political actors the option of a sponsored advertisement. In fact, as I will point out, a large 
share of the 2018/2019 EU’s political communication engaged the internet and the "free media.” 
 
From the European Commission to the European Parliament, European institutions reach out to 
citizens in many ways. There is no unique and omnipresent form of EU political communication. 
Although the general mechanism for their communication is political PR, institutions also integrate 
political marketing and advertising to convey their messages. Yet, EU communication primarily 
aims at improving its self-appearance and encouraging people’s constructive reasoning of the 
content of politics: according to Monaghan, the EU’s communication strategy is at its core “an 
attempt to strengthen the democratic legitimacy of EU governance by bringing EU institutions and 
governance structures closer to citizens”183: typical characteristics for political PR.  
 
3.2. Communication frameworks   
The amount of regulations, frameworks, guidelines, decisions and recommendations on 
communication of the EU institutions is enormous. Seeing that the communication of the EU has 
regularly been targeted by authors184 the institutions have responded producing a variety of 
documents declaring various intentions. In the following chapter, I intend to shed light on this 
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complex issue by considering the most relevant ones in order to pave the way for the analysis of 
the EU communication activities in 2018/2019.  
 
What is the legal framework of the EU’s communication policies? According to the 
REGULATION (EU) No 1303/2013185 of the European Commission and the European Parliament 
of December 2013,  
 
“Member States and managing authorities shall be responsible for  
(a) drawing up communication strategies  
(b) ensuring the establishment of a single website or a single website portal providing 
information on, and access to, all operational programmes in that Member State (...)   
(c) informing potential beneficiaries about funding oppor-tunities under operational 
programmes” (Article 115 / REGULATION (EU) No 1303/2013)186   
 
Almost all major communication campaigns are organized by the Commission’s or the 
Parliament’s respective Directorate-General (DG). For the purpose of this study of the EU-Impact 
on citizens, the Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy (DG -Regio) plays a key role. 
The DG-Regio is responsible for “Informing potential beneficiaries about funding opportunities; 
publicising the achievements of cohesion policy to citizens; carrying out one major annual 
information activity”187 and “carrying out one major annual information activity.”188 Further, 
according to the “Communication Handbook for the EU Agencies”189, the DG is in charge of 
establishing guidelines and of converting the received input into concrete output.  
 
The Strategic Plan 2016 - 2020 is, according to the EU Commission, the central plan in the area 
of communication for the years 2016-2020.190 The Plan was confirmed in 2015 by the Director-
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General Communication (DG-Comm).191 Its main objective is to reform the way communication 
is done in the European Commission and to adapt the content to changing realities.  
According to the plan, the Union “should be bigger and more ambitious on big things, and smaller 
and more modest on small things”.192 Communication should prioritize the main policy areas of 
the EU: jobs, growth and investment; the digital single market; the energy union and climate; the 
internal market; the economic and monetary union; justice and the fundamental rights; migration; 
the EU as a stronger global actor and democratic change.193 In order to achieve a higher effectivity 
and reach out to people, “communication has to be sustained throughout the policy making cycle 
and has to illustrate how EU policy making affects citizens in their daily lives.”194 The plan 
identifies three types of functions for the DG-Comm. First, the “executive service” to colleagues 
and cabinets using political reports and analysis, results obtained from the Eurobarometer, media 
analysis and the feedback obtained from citizens on past communication,195 recalling the 
“intervention logic of DG-Comm services”196: “Listen”, “Advise” and “Engage”.197 Second, the 
“corporate service”198 to achieve digital transformation; make citizens aware of the 10 political 
priorities - with a particular focus on “jobs, growth and investment” as the overarching priority; 
“exchange best practices” on communication as well as “receive technical assistance” for 
communication tools and services and “align their sectoral communication strategies/ plans to the 
corporate messaging”,199 gaining more effectiveness and saving costs. Lastly, the “communication 
service”200 of DG-Comm aims at: Achieving targeted bonds with media and at fostering media 
coverage, achieving higher awareness of the citizens on the EU and their role and rights while 
fostering dialogues with citizens.201 
The strategic plan also implemented a mechanism to monitor ongoing communication campaigns 
about awareness-raising on the benefits of EU-funding. To achieve this, the plan identifies an 
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indicator which will be controlled on a constant basis to monitor the progress made: “Result 
indicator 1: Cumulative number of people having been able to recall the messages of corporate 
actions 2016 - 2020”. According to the paper, the indicator serves to verify whether the 
commission's corporate communication has successfully achieved that citizens “recall” the 
“success stories” and “projects” promoted by the EU.202 Does the plan acknowledge the inputs 
discussed and converts them into guidelines? In fact, DG-Comm’s strategic plan draws the 
attention to the changes the world and the countries of Europe have been going through and would 
eventually go on dealing with. The paper explicitly recalls that “Communication typically is a 
flanking measure, subject to externalities of two types”,203 the influence of both content and 
substance of the dossiers to be communicated204 being the first type and the complex environment 
of “28 national public spaces and an emerging public sphere”205 on the other side. The framework 
considers the latter type of externalities to be mainly influenced by the following factors: 
“International, national and regional political factors; International, national and regional 
economic factors; Level of trust in political institutions (international, national) and in media; 
Media habits / practice / attitude” and “Technological developments, notably in the information 
and communications technologies”.206 
 
Lastly, when referring to European communication on a strategic level, one should take the 
“INFORM”-network into consideration. The Network was launched by the DG-Regio in 2008.207 
The network is especially relevant for this study, because it targets the communication of the ERDF 
and Cohesion fund in member states.208 According to the DG-Regio “it is essential to make 
potential beneficiaries aware of existing funding opportunities and to communicate to citizens the 
results of these investments.” INFORM is a network of officials in charge of communication all 
over the EU.209 The Network aims at exchanging results, best practices and evaluations on past 
                                                
202 ibidem: 16. 
203 ibidem: 4. 
204 ibidem: 4. 
205 ibidem: 4. 
206 ibidem: 4. 
207 Regional Policy Inforegio. Information & Communication - Inform Network. 2019. https://ec.europa.eu/regional 
_policy/archive/country/commu/inform_meeting07062008_en.cfm?nmenu=4  (last accessed: 25.5.2019 / 14:00).  
208 European Commission. INFORM network. 2019d. https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/communicatio 
n/inform-network/ (last accessed: 25.5.2019 / 15:00).  
209 European Commission, 2019d: 1.  
49 
communication actions, coordinating communication between national governments and the 
Commission, evaluating and debating the effectiveness of communication actions and proposing 
recommendations to strengthen the range and added value of the campaigns.210 Although being 
just a network and framework of exchange, INFORM, by way of regular meetings211 to discuss 
and evaluate what has been done so far, generates important information and suggestions for the 
DG-Regio.  
The often complex and extensively amended plans like the Strategic Plan 2016-2020 and the DG 
Regio’s INFORM provide useful references for finding out what EU policy intends to achieve in 
the area of communication in recent years.  
  
3.3. The 2018/2019 awareness campaigns  
By the time this study is being conducted, the EU institutions are recurring to numerous awareness 
campaigns to convey citizens the message that the EU and its funding programmes are part of their 
daily lives. Due to the fact that especially online communication through social media platforms 
is deleted, modified and unavailable after a short period of time, this study is qualitatively 
examining the most recent 2018/2019 campaigns. The chosen time frame enables us to analyse 
some of the most striking and innovative campaigns of the last years with a particular focus on 
conveying the positive impact on citizens through EU-funds. Additionally, only by analysing the 
2018/2019 communication, are we able to take into account both great crisis: The eurozone crisis 
and the refugee crisis, affecting both Germany and Portugal. Finally, the 2019 European elections 
have been distinguished by many political actors, such as French President Emmanuel Macron, as 
“Undoubtedly the most important”212 elections for the future of the EU, making it even more 
important to have a look on the EU’s communication actions.  
 
The data used to characterise these campaigns was gathered both from primary and secondary 
sources such as official press releases, institutions websites, online content, social media activity 
and leaflets etc. In order to better analyse these recent communication activities, we will consider 
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the campaigns and activities by the sending entity: The European Commission, the European 
Parliament and the other EU institutions.  
 
3.3.1. European Commission 
Considering the Commission’s communication activities, the EU in my region campaign might be 
the most relevant. Although the campaign received great support from the DG-Comm, it was 
mainly DG-Regio that had initially launched the sequence of campaigns in 2016. According to the 
European Commission, it is its first general campaign directly aiming at creating awareness of the 
EU-funds and their impact on citizens and the region they live in. Under the motto “Getting citizens 
closer to the EU”213 it involves events in numerous member states, among them Germany and 
Portugal. In 2018/2019 the campaign integrated four different actions: An “EU Open Project 
Days”, a “treasure hunt”, a “photo competition” and a “blogging campaign”.214 On the campaigns’ 
own website, the viewer is welcomed with a short promotional video explaining the campaigns’ 
core ambition: “We invite Europeans to look around, and notice that the EU is not in Brussels but 
everywhere.”215 According to the responsible entity, the main aim of these actions was to 
incentivize citizens all over Europe to visit EU-funded projects. This was based on the rationale 
that citizens would share their experiences through posting images and impressions on social 
media platforms and tell their relatives, friends and colleagues about the interesting experience.216 
Several EU Open-project -days were designed to raise citizens’ awareness that the visited 
“Schools, hospitals, modern public transport”217 behind their backyard might have been funded by 
the EU. A practical example is the “treasure hunts” that took place at the new fire station in Covilhã 
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in Portugal218 and guided participants through emblematic EU-funded projects.219 The 2018 
campaign has managed to co-organise more than 2.500 local events mobilizing about 450.000 
people to discover regional projects.220  
The photo competition also aimed at spreading information on EU-funded projects by the people. 
Casual photographers were asked to photograph examples of concrete EU-funded projects all over 
Europe.221 The competition was advertised via all major social media platforms and included video 
content to motivate citizens to participate and share their views on regional EU-funded projects 
with others. In the 2018’s edition, 530 photos were sent into competition by participants, which 
included a winner from Germany222 and two from Portugal.223 From October 2018, the winning 
pictures were then shown in an exhibition travelling throughout the whole EU. Another part of the 
2018 EU in my region campaign included a bloggers’ contest which allowed bloggers from all 
over Europe to conceive and write a blog post and forward it to the DG-Regio. An independent 
jury chose three winners out of the 120 submitted posts.224 Their scores involved the blogs public 
votes and social media activities.225 Winning blogs were published on the European Commission’s 
own blog-website BlogActive.eu and on the Commission's web page. While Radu Dumitrescu 
from Romania wrote a piece about the European Youth Weeks, Amaury Bisiaux from France 
dedicated his article to the EU co-funded Interrail pass and Mari Trini Giner from Spain presented 
the Medicsen Startup which “seeks to increase the quality of life for diabetes patients and also 
received EU funding.226  
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The 2018 EU in My Region campaign was advertised in a large number of social media platforms 
such as Facebook, Instagram, Twitter and Youtube. Promotional videos were shared and an online 
“communication toolkit”,227 which included a variety of promotional posters and videos free of 
charge, was made available.  
 
Apart from the DG-Regio’s EU in my Region- campaign, another communication action of the 
Commission and it’s DG worth mentioning is the REGIOSTARS campaign: Since 2008 the 
“Commission hands out annual “REGIOSTARS” awards to EU-funded projects which demonstrate 
excellence and new approaches in regional development.”228 The projects are awarded in a variety 
of categories such as “smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, urban development and a topic of 
the year.”229 In this campaign, the Commission uses country specific cases to increase the 
awareness on EU-funds: in the context of REGIOSTARS awards of 2018, one of five awards 
attributed to all 28 EU countries went to the city of Fundão. In the category “Supporting smart 
industrial transition” the city won the award “with it’s Business and Shared Service Centre”,230 
which, according to the Portuguese broadcasting company Rádio e Televisão de Portugal (RTP) 
and the news agency LUSA, is expected to contribute to the creation of 500 jobs in the area of new 
technologies in the region.231 The REGIOSTARS campaign did not include a presence on all social 
media platforms. Only some video contents, displaying the winning projects and the relevant data 
on the EU-funding, were shared through the EU in my Region Youtube-account as well as through 
several posts on the European Commission’s Instagram account. Winners were awarded in the 
context of a prize-giving ceremony which, in 2018, included over 1.200 participants coming from 
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local politics, media and civil society.232 This face-to-face approach surely contributed to targeting 
a more diverse audience.  
 
A concrete example for a purely new-media-focused communication, targeting younger EU-
citizens, is the 2019 Road Trip Project campaign by both DG-Regio and DG-Comm. According 
to the Commission, it is aimed at a target group of 18-24 year old Europeans.233 The initiative 
consists of a sequence of short clips of about five to six minutes each. Four groups of young 
Europeans take viewers along in their different experiences throughout Europe.234 In the Episode 
“Road Trip Project Chaves Verín Challenge” Yloa, from the Netherlands, and Fabio, from Spain, 
take the viewer through a trip to the cities of Chaves, Portugal and Verín, Spain.235 In the clip, both 
protagonists introduce the spectator to the Eurocity partnership of both cities. Both are given a 
Eurocity / “Eurocidade” Chaves-Verín card that allows citizens to benefit from a variety of services 
and promotions in both cities of the “eurocity” region. In the clip, the viewer is able to accompany 
both Europeans through their visit of several places in both cities such as the SPA “Termas de 
Chaves” or the Museum of the Flaviense Region in Chaves or the municipal library, the wine 
museum and the swimming pool in Vérin.  
The clip about the eurocity-region of Chaves-Verín is just one of the many episodes of the 
campaign. At the end of the episode all participants of the four different routes meet in the city of 
Berlin and visit a variety of attractions built and financed with the support of the EU-funds236. 
Although the campaign was present in some social media platforms like Instagram and Youtube, 
its reach and media coverage were relatively poor. Over 8 months after its first publication, the 
clip about the Eurocity Chaves-Vérin had totaled only 451237 views and the clip about the reunion 
in Berlin only 201238 views. The google data-bank for online news had only registered a total of 8 
posts covering “The Road Trip Project” and 6 for “EU Road Trip Project”.239   
                                                
232 European Commission. REGIOSTARS Awards. 2019g.  https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/regio-stars-
awards/? Allnews=true#1 (last accessed: 2.6.19 / 20:00). 
233 European Commission, 2019e: 1.  
234 Note: Along the baltic; the danube river; the mediterranean and the Atlantic.  
235 European Commission. Road Trip Project / Chaves-Verín Challenge. [video source] 2019i. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kdtVOBexrcY (last accessed: 3.6.19 / 12:00). 
236 European Commission. Road Trip Project / Reunited in Berlin. EUinMyRegion. [online video content], 3.9.2018. 
2018c. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=59pBVLub5wo&t=237s (last accessed: 3.6.19 / 12:00). 
237 Note: Exact date and time of elevation: 13th of May 2019 / 18:22.  
238 Note: Exact date & time of elevation: 13th of May 2019 / 18:29. 
239 idem: 13th of May 2019 / 18:40. 
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Lastly, one should consider the sequence of debates that the Commission and its Directorate-
Generals have launched throughout the last five years. Only in 2018 over 60 local and regional 
dialogues were organised in 8 different countries including the German cities of Leipzig, 
Karlsruhe, Stuttgart and Greifswald.240 According to the Commission, these debates aim “to 
discuss the impact of EU actions in territorial contexts”241 bringing “together a variety of local 
stakeholders and interested citizens, engaging them in open exchanges about the benefits and 
challenges linked to the delivering of EU funding”.242 A suitable example is the “Europe-week” 
taking place every year in the Federal State of Saarland, Germany, which aims at communicating 
to citizens the “European idea” through several debates and round tables.243 This debate 
mechanism is not only a way to inform and to incentivize the public on thinking and talking about 
EU-funded projects but also a way for decision makers to rethink the EU-funding and its 
acceptance among the citizens with consequences for the Union’s next financial framework, 
starting in 2021. 
 
3.3.2. European Parliament  
Maybe the most suitable example of the European Parliament’s communication on EU-funds and 
their benefits for citizens within the given time frame, is the What Europe does for me - campaign. 
This campaign launched in early 2019 by the European Parliament’s Research Service (EPRS) in 
partnership with the parliament’s DG for Communication, is an online campaign designed to 
demonstrate “the EU’s positive impact on individual citizens and local communities.”244 To 
achieve this, the campaign uses a variety of tools such as a website and a newly created application 
for mobile devices. Under www.what-europe-does-for-me.eu viewers find an interactive website 
available in all official languages of the EU.245 The viewer may then choose from the categories 
                                                
240 European Commission. Local Debates. 2019h: 1. 
https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/informing/debates_ planning.pdf (last accessed: 5.6.19 / 10:00). 
241 European Commission, 2019e: 1. 
242 idem. 
243 Ministerium für Finanzen und Europa - Saarland. Europawoche 2018 - der europäische Gedanke wird weiter 
getragen. 24.4.2018. https://www.saarland.de/235685.htm (last accessed: 5.7.19 / 9:00). 
244 European Parliament. What Europe does for me - Press. 20.5.2019. 2019a: 1. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/ en/press-room/elections-press-kit/6/what-europe-does-for-me (last accessed: 
5.6.19 / 10:00). 
245 European Parliament. What Europe does for me. 2019b  http://www.what-europe-does-for-me.eu (last accessed: 
5.6.19 / 11:00). 
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“In my region”, “In my life” or “In focus”. The “In my region” category presents a search field 
and an interactive map of the EU which allows users to find any European region or city. Taking 
the “Lisbon Metropolitan Area”, the website lists a variety of projects financed or co-financed by 
EU-funding programmes: such as the hospital of Carnaxide with new units focusing on treating 
chronic diseases. The website informs the viewer that it “was financed to the tune of 50% from 
EU funds and aims to end inequalities in health, improve access to social services and foster social 
inclusion.”246 The same ‘infobox’ of the website also refers to the Portugal 2020247 framework, 
enabling viewers to get access to the external website of this framework. If we now insert “Berlin” 
in the search field as another example, the website displays a similar list of practical examples of 
funded projects and overall financial support for the region. Be it the 635 million euros received 
from the ERDF or the 215 million euros received from the ESF, both part of the EU financial 
framework 2014-2020, or be it the over 4.000 medium to small size companies that have received 
a total funding of 1,4 billion euros over the last 20 years by the European Investment Bank, the 
website’s visitor is informed about what the EU has done for people in the Berlin area.248  
In the section “In my Life” visitors are able to choose a specific subject that directly affects their 
daily lives and lifestyle: From “Cyclists” and “Hairdressers” to “Undeclared workers” and “People 
living in remote areas” and from “people who want to avoid using plastic bags” and “Masters 
students” to “people concerned about terrorism” and “young unemployed people”, this category 
offers a huge variety of branches for visitors to click on. Each of these “branches” provides viewers 
with vast information and external links on topics directly or indirectly linked to the chosen aspect. 
When clicking on the branch for “hairdressers”, for instance, the website provides the viewer with 
detailed information on a variety of aspects concerning this profession. The viewer receives 
information gathered by the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (EU-OSHA), on how 
the frequent contact of chemicals can harm the hairdresser’s skin and health as well as information 
on two projects funded by the EU for the prevention of occupational skin diseases in the 
hairdressing sector – SafeHair 1.0 (2010) and SafeHair 2.0 (2011).249 One more example: When 
clicking on the branch “Old workers” the website viewer receives information about the allocation 
of ESF funds for the participation of “Around 576.000 older people” who benefited from “ESF 
                                                
246 European Parliament, 2019b: 1. 
247 Note: See chapter 1.  
248 European Parliament, 2019b: 1. 
249 idem. 
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lifelong learning support across the EU between 2007 and 2010”250. The programme encourages 
citizens over 55, who think that their working potential is not “fully used”251, to participate in 
continuing professional education programmes. Visitors get specific information and access to 
external links to apply for these programmes. The last section In Focus depicts trends and topics 
of EU policy making and current “construction sites” of the EU integration. Ranging from the 
“Fight against tax fraud”; “Migration”; “the fight against unemployment”, “Environmental 
protection”, “Fisheries”; “Digital Transformation” to “Future of the EU”,252 253 this branch 
provides the viewer with a variety of current and controversial topics concerning the EU.  
 
Another important part of the What Europe does for me - campaign was the release of the Citizens’ 
App (2019). This Application provides citizens with latest news of European concern, taking the 
user's location and home region into special consideration. As in the What Europe does for me - 
website, the user is able to search for any region and find concretely funded projects in an 
interactive map of the EU. The app also provides an agenda which, if previously agreed upon by 
the users, synchronises major events of European interest with the users’ personal calendar, e.g. 
enabling users to be informed about upcoming debates of European parties’ 
“Spitzenkandidaten”254 or the next nearest European “Open Day”. The app also features a variety 
of current topics including different views while also providing mechanisms for users to give their 
feedback and evaluate articles and debates. Although the application might be a different tool used 
to reach out to citizens, its content does not vary significantly from the content provided in the 
previously discussed website. A particularly interesting way of the What Europe does for me 
campaign is the approach to reach citizens through social media platforms providing them with 
practical cases of European citizens experiencing the benefits of the EU. Finally, the campaign 
also includes the series “Do you know what EU does in…?”255 This series of videos published 
through the parliament’s instagram account use the feature of storytelling to raise awareness on 
specific impacts in member states.   




253 Note: Among many more.  
254 Note: German term increasingly used in european politics for the head of a european party’s list.  
255 European Parliament. Official Instagram account of the European Parliament. 2019c: 1.  
https://www.instagram.com/europeanparliament/ (last accessed: 5.6.19 / 11:00). 
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Apart from these very specific examples of the latest outputs of the EP’s communication policy, 
the DG for Communication continues in pursuing its general agenda of bringing the European 
Parliament closer to the people. Especially the pre-election campaign of 2019 has shown how the 
Parliament made an effort to communicate its functions and its significance as the democratic pillar 
of the EU. To this end, the parliament used a variety of tools such as the free media, including 
social media platforms like Facebook, Instagram and Twitter in order to mobilise people to take 
advantage of their right to vote. Programmes like #thistimeiamvoting were implemented all over 
Europe to raise awareness on European elections. Also, as mentioned in previous chapters, the 
European parties themselves launched their own campaigns previously to or even within a 
legislative period of the European parliament. Some parties might follow a pro-European approach 
of communicating with citizens, underlining the EU efforts through funds and other advantages. 
As we have seen in chapter 2, others might do the contrary.  
In general terms, the DG-Comm of the European Parliament regards “going local and reaching out 
to people through the European Parliament Liaison Offices (EPLOs) in the 28 EU Member States 
and in Washington”256 as well as “increase the awareness on the European Parliament among 
citizens, stakeholders and opinion leaders through bespoke communication and information 
campaigns and online channels”257 as its most important goals in 2019.  
  
3.3.3. Other EU Actors  
At this point, I want to pay attention to other important EU actors, and look at the role they play 
in producing awareness of the benefits of the EU, starting with the European Council. In the 
previous subchapter about the EU’s communication, we have seen that the members of national 
cabinets have their own - often partisan - dynamic of communicating EU - relevant issues. 
However, one great producer of communication output of the European Council in recent years 
has been the president of the European Council himself. Donald Tusk has shaped his post as 
president with a new approach in communicating with citizens, especially through his activities 
and presence in social media platforms. He is the representative of a EU-institution with the highest 
                                                
256 European Parliament. Directorate-General for Communication. 2019d: 1.  https://www.europarl.europa.eu/the-
secretary-general/en/directorates-general/comm (last accessed: 5.6.19 / 11:00). 
257 European Parliament, 2019d: 1. 
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reach on social media: With 1,05 million followers on twitter he is ranking first in the amount of 
followers which may be an indicator for the influence he has.258  
 
One particular interesting campaign of the European Council is the online campaign entitled 
#EUropeans. This 2019-launched campaign consists of a sequence of clips. In the clips, never 
longer than three minutes, the viewer is told a personal story of an european citizen. Be it the 11 
year old Maria Coutinho from Lisbon suffering from cerebral paresis who enrolled in an adapted 
surf course, “surf adaptado”259, which was co-organised by the EU in the beach of Carcavelos, or 
be it Anne Goldhammer-Michl who, thanks to the EU-funded “guide”260 consultancy, specialised 
in business planning, managed to start her own business as a nutrition consultant after having 
constantly suffered from migraine due to nutrition issues.261 Interesting about most of the clips is 
that the viewer is not permanently informed about EU-funding efforts. Only after a closer look and 
further research one can find out that programmes and projects like the “adapted surf”- courses 
and “guide” receive support from the EU. 
 
Finally, one should also consider the EU as an autonomous entity in political communication. The 
2019 EU and me - campaign was launched as a joint venture of the Commission, the Parliament 
and the Council. The campaign is not linked to any specific EU-institution and is available online 
under the overall europa.eu - domain. The campaign consists of several activities that aim at 
promoting citizens awareness. First, an informational campaign which uses tools like the 
“europa.eu/euandme” website, social media channel’s of the European institutions as well as 
informational brochures available at any “Europe direct space” all over Europe.262 Second, the 
#EUandMe story campaign, in which, similar to the #EUropeans campaign launched by the 
European Council, a variety of citizen’s success stories dealing with EU-funding of any kind are 
                                                
258 Donald Tusk. Official Twitter account. @eucopresident. 2019. https://twitter.com/eucopresident (last accessed: 
5.6.19 / 14:00). 
259 European Council. #EUropeans: A very special surfer girl. [video source] Council of the EU, 19.4.2019. 2019a. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xi8jDX2kKiE (last accessed: 5.6.19 / 14:00). 
260 European Council. #EUropeans: Reinvent yourself. [video source] Council of the EU, 29.5.2019. 2019b 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= Gd0-bFkIEec (last accessed: 29.6.19 / 14:00). 
261 European Council, 2019b. 
262 European Union. My Working Rights. My Life. 2019c. https://europa.eu/euandme/passion/social-rights_en (last 
accessed: 5.6.19 / 18:23). 
59 
told and further developed. Third, and finally a “Young Filmmakers Competition” was 
launched.263  
 
Another campaign which was aimed to be representing the EU as a whole is InvestEU. The 
European Investment Bank together with the European Commission play a central role in 
promoting this campaign. The campaign is aimed at creating awareness about “success stories of 
real people who have benefited from EU investments or whose projects have been enabled by EU 
support.”264 Having its own website265 dedicated to the investment done by the EU, it provides 
visitors with a variety of success stories on how EU investment and funding affects the lives of 
people. Similar to the “What Europe does for me”- website, the visitor is able to search through a 
variety of regions and cities to find projects in his or her own neighborhood.266 If one happens to 
search for projects in Germany, the website provides a total of 21 recent examples on EU-funding 
in the country, such as a project involving 3,1 million euros of funding provided by the ERDF in 
the period from 2016-2019. The “AUXILIA”-project267 created a research group within the 
Technical University of Chemnitz that is currently developing smart and innovative solutions for 
patients suffering from dementia, that allows them to stay in their own home the longest possible 
time without having to move to a clinic or other care establishments. According to the “InvestEU”-
website, this investment has the potential of clearly improving the lives of dementia patients, 1,6 
million of them living currently in Germany. When searching for Portuguese projects, the website 
provides just 4 projects. One of which explains the viewer how the infrastructure of the business-
faculty of the Universidade Nova SBE of Lisbon was co-financed with 25 million euros of the EU 
budget including a 16 million loan of the European Fund for Strategic Investment (EFSI) for 2014-
2020. On its website, the “InvestEU”- campaign states that the funding contributed to making the 
university and the city of Lisbon more “future oriented” and “global”.268  
                                                
263 European Union. Young Filmmakers Competition. 2019d. https://europa.eu/euandme/winners_en (last accessed: 
5.6.19 / 18:23). 
264 European Union. Materials for Partners. 2019e. https://europa.eu/investeu/content/materials-partners_de (last 
accessed: 5.6.19 / 18:25). 
265 European Union. InvestEU. 2019f. https://europa.eu/investeu/home_en (last accessed: 5.6.19 / 18:50). 
266 European Union. InvestEU - projects. 2019g. https://europa.eu/investeu/projects_de (last accessed: 5.6.19 / 
18:52). 
267 European Union. InvestEU - AUXILIA. 2019h.  https://europa.eu/investeu/projects/help-dementia-patients_de 
(last accessed: 5.6.19 / 19:00). 
268 European Union. InvestEU - Nova SBE. 2019i. https://europa.eu/investeu/projects/unique-seat-learning_de (last 
accessed: 5.6.19 / 19:00). 
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4. The evaluation: Is the EU’s communication up to date? 
We have seen how the political environment in both countries and the EU has changed between 
2008 and 2018. We have also seen how the EU institution reacted to these changes through 
communicating to citizens how EU- projects and funds affect their daily lives. However, we have 
not yet evaluated these communication efforts. This chapter will therefore include a two-step-
analysis to qualitatively examine the adaptivity and relevance of the 2018/2019 communication 
campaigns on the one hand and the future perspectives for the EU’s political communication on 
the other. The 2019 European Elections will also be considered in a short excursus at the end of 
this chapter. 
 
4.1. The Analysis 
In the past, scholars have used different approaches to analyse the multidisciplinary field of 
political communication. Many analyses have been conducted from a sociological point of view, 
such as the system theory approaches of Luhmann or Parson269 or approaches focusing on the 
system of social actions, as done by Münch.270 However, in this study we are interested in the 
political science point of view on political communication. These political science approaches are, 
according to Jarren and Donges, characterised by putting the actors producing political 
communication and their surrounding political environment in the center of the analysis.271 
Following this approach, this study combines both a qualitative multi-criteria analysis of the 
discussed 2018/2019 campaigns,272 engaging a content analysis of political communication, and a 
qualitative SWOT-analysis to determine perspectives for future developments for the EU’s 
communication while considering the environmental system.  
 
4.1.1. Analysis I: Content analysis  
The first part of the analysis aims at examining the campaigns’ designs, content and messages and 
whether they are ‘successfully’ conveying the impact of EU-measures to citizens and whether they 
are responding to environmental changes. I have distinguished three central questions deriving 
                                                
269 Jarren; Donges, 2017: 41. See also: Niklas Luhmann. Organisation und Entscheidung. Opladen, 2002: 1.  
270 Richard Münch. Dialektik der Kommunikationsgesellschaft. Suhrkamp, 1991: 1. 
271 Jarren; Donges, 2017: 41. 
272 Note: Which will include a quantitative operationalisation of criteria.  
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from this study’s context: First, does the campaign convey the message of EU impact in citizens’ 
lives presented in chapter 1? Second, is this message conveyed in an innovative way to cope with 
a possible EU-detachment of citizens? And third, are the tools used for the campaigns effective to 
cope with the changing media environment?  
I have operationalised these questions into three main hypotheses:  
H1: Campaigns convey the importance of EU-impact in citizens’ lives 
H2: The campaigns’ content responds to changes in citizens EU-attachment   
H3: The campaigns’ tools respond to changes in the media environment   
The three hypotheses - H1, H2 and H3 - will be verified by recurring to the so-called content 
analysis of political communication. This “extremely important method for research into political 
communication”273 is, according to Lombard, Snyder-Duch, and Bracken, especially appropriate 
for a great share of political communication studies and in particular for the analysis of political 
messages.274 To be able to provide differentiated answers, the primary sources of the campaigns 
have been analysed according to their sending institution.275  
 
The content analysis of the EU campaigns consists of different analytical steps all guided by the 
“general order of analytical activities” by Berg and Lune.276 To begin with, the available data and 
primary sources - both written and visual or audiovisual277 - such as EU campaigns, websites, 
posts278 and event description were collected through the internet and the EU databases of their 
websites. In the following, the data was transcripted into written text and explained279 and the 
materials’ messages were inductively280 identified. Thirdly, the codes and messages were 
transformed into “categorical labels or themes.”281 Berg and Lune argue that the chosen categories 
                                                
273 William L. Benoit. Content Analysis in Political Communication. 2010: 268. 
274 Matthew Lombard; Jennifer Snyder-Dutch; Cheryl Campanella Bracken. Content Analysis in Mass 
Communication: Assessment and Reporting of Intercoder Reliability. In Human Communication Research, Vol.28, 
2002: 587-604.   
275 Note: See chapter 3.3. 
276 idem. 
277 Note: Such as “field notes, transcripts, image sequences, news reports” Bruce L. Berg; Howard Lune. Qualitative 
Research Methods for the Social Sciences. Pearson, 2016: 184. and also “visual materials, such as photographs, 
drawings, cartoons, cartoon strips and graphic novels, film, or architecture.” Berg; Lune, 2016: 184.  
278 Note: on social media platforms. 
279 Note: As depicted in chapter 3.3. 
280 Berg; Lune, 2016: 184.  
281 idem. 
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should mirror the “categories of meaning used by the study subjects or in the context of the study 
site”.282 The deriving categories then form a so-called criteria catalogue.283 Table [1] shows the 
three hypotheses with their specific criteria catalogues. The depicted criteria derives from what 
this study has identified, mainly throughout chapter 1 and 2 as being fundamental for an effective 
communication of EU-Impact in citizens’ lives. To continue, the campaigns were analysed 
according to the established pattern and results were codified. EU campaigns in which the criteria 
was applicable were coded with a “1”, in the opposite case a “0”. This way campaigns could be 
evaluated specifically on their performance concerning the specific hypothesis. Detailed findings 
of the criteria catalogue and content analysis may be found in table [2], displayed in this study’s 
appendix.  
Table [1]: Hypotheses and specific criteria catalogues 
H1: Campaigns convey the 
importance of EU-impact in the 
citizens lives 
H2: The campaigns’ contents 
respond to changes in citizens EU-
attachment   
H3: The campaigns tools respond to 
changes in the media environment   
 
A) Mention concrete funding? 
 
B) Use practical examples? 
 
C) Use specific German or 
Portuguese cases? 
 
D) Use Storytelling? 
 
E) Use concrete data? 
 
F) Appeal to different 
generations? 
 
A) Messages conveyed in a 
simple way and avoiding 
technical language? 
B) Messages encourage 
different perspectives on 
the EU? 
C) Are emotions used to 
trigger interest? 
D) Content confronts 
euroscepticist concerns? 
E) Campaigns advertise the 
Union not the Institutions? 
F) Messages Incentivise 
political participation and 
interest? 
A) Does the campaign have its 
own website? 





- Posts include video 
content? 
C) Face to face campaigns? 
D) Use of ‘conventional 
media’ (e.g. radio, tv, 





                                                
282 ibidem: 183.  
283 Note: A method also used in analysing corporate communication. see also: Alina Seidel. Kundenorientierte 
Kommunikation. Konzeptionalisierung und empirische Analyse im Dienstleistungsbereich. Hallesche Schriften zur 
Betriebswirtschaft. Vol. 21, 2006: 110. 
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Evaluating the findings  
After having applied the criteria to the content of the different campaigns of the European 
Commission, the European Parliament and other institutions, several observations should be 
considered: When it comes to making citizens aware of the impact the EU has in their lives and on 
specific regions (H1) all nine campaigns under consideration scored an average of 68,5 percent in 
accordance to the established conditions. H1 was the hypothesis under which the campaigns scored 
the most, followed by the campaigns’ adaptation to a differentiated (digital) media environment 
(H3), where campaigns scored an average of 54,5 percent. Finally, the campaigns’ response to the 
citizens’ changing view on the EU (H2) reached only about 53 percent.  
What are the reasons for a relatively low score of the campaigns on adapting with the changing 
perceptions of citizens (H2) and the digital transformation (H3)?  
 
As regards the lower performance of campaigns on H3, a possible reason could be found in the 
campaigns’ strong prioritisation of online media. What might sound paradox at first, seeing the 
online usage of both Portuguese and German citizens has dramatically increased from 2008 to 
2018,284 can be explained by the fact that the ‘old’285 media is “still considerable” as Niklewicz 
argues.286 The exclusive focus of many campaigns like the #EUropeans, the Road Trip Project or 
the #EUandMe - campaign on social platforms and the new media, restrained these campaigns 
from a better compliance with the chosen criteria. Of course, some of these campaigns where 
specifically conceived for the online sphere. But policy makers must take into account that still 
today, online media does not reach all sectors of the population in Europe. Particularly, many older 
people might be less focused on the digital world. Also, an extreme prioritisation on online media 
makes the campaigns vulnerable to threats and risks.287 
 
Regarding the increasing detachment of some citizens from the European elites, which, as we have 
seen in chapter 2, leads to a shift in the citizens’ EU perceptions (H2), the reasons for the low 
performance of campaigns might be several: however, only one third of the campaigns engaged 
content which, directly or indirectly, confronts or mentions euroscepticism or responds to the 
                                                
284 Note: See chapter 2.2.2.  
285 Note: Meaning more conventional media.  
286 Niklewicz, 2017: 46. 
287 Note: See chapter 2.2.2. 
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perceived loss of trust in the EU crisis-management. Also, more than half of the campaigns were 
conceived to advertise the specific institutions of the EU. Therefore, according to Niklewicz, they 
lose an important opportunity to connect to citizens through one ‘EU voice’.288 
 
If we consider the total performance within the respective institutional categories under the three 
working hypotheses (H1; H2 and H3), it seems surprising that neither the European Commission 
nor the European Parliament performed highest. Instead, the group of ‘other EU actors’,289 such 
as the EU and ME - campaign, accomplished the most criteria of the catalogue,290 followed by the 
European Parliament’s campaigns291 and the European Commission’s campaigns.292 This shows 
how campaigns implemented as joint-ventures of the different EU institutions could be the answer 
for successful future campaigns in the area.  
The one out of nine campaigns performing the best on all of the categories of this analysis was the 
EU in my Region - campaign by the European Commission. This campaign verified almost all 
established criteria of conveying the message of impact through EU-funding. Integrating a variety 
of practical examples, with a specific approach for both Portugal and Germany, using 
“storytelling” as a method to capture people's awareness, were important assets distinguishing this 
campaign. Also, the fact that it not only involved a prominent presence of the new media but also 
involved face-to-face approaches such as the organization of several “treasure hunts”  leading 
citizens through EU-funded projects in Germany, Portugal and the whole EU, explains part of the 
success. On the other side, the lowest performing campaign was the REGIOSTARS - campaign 
which performed relatively weak, only corresponding to 16,7 percent of the criteria (H2). A reason 
could be a certain degree of exclusivity of the project that does not foresee any mechanisms to 
reach people who really need to be convinced on the EU’s performance by transmitting clear and 




                                                
288 Niklewicz, 2017: 48. 
289 Note: which includes the joint-venture campaign of European Commission, Parliament and Commission. 
290 Note: 61,8 percent. 
291 Note: 52,2 percent. 
292 Note: 50,8 percent. 
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Limitations 
When establishing such a content analysis as well as a criteria catalogue, one must be aware that 
the chosen criteria is - however objectively - constrained by the subjectivity of the researcher. 
Although the method used by Berg, Lune and also Seidel293 is commonly used in the research of 
political communication, it bears some risks that the reader needs to take into account. The 
formulation of criteria resulted from the argumentation and recommendations of the previous 
chapters. It mirrors - to a certain extent - what researches in this field believe is needed to 
strengthen the EU’s political communication in times of change. However, any decision in favour 
of a certain criteria in political science is also a decision against some other categories and criteria. 
Because of this restriction, I have chosen to combine this first, highly specific294 and possibly 
subjective step of the analysis, with a second step which takes into account the perspectives and 
overall potential of the EU’s political communication.  
 
One has to bare in mind that the EU’s campaigns are designed for a variety of purposes aiming at 
informing citizens about completely different fields including those, which are not considered in 
this analysis’ criteria catalogue. Although some campaigns scored relatively low results through 
the specific content analysis they may be achieving their aim in other aspects. The criteria 
implemented in this first analysis enables us to evaluate the campaigns efforts to cope with a 
changing environment on the basis of what has been discussed in the previous chapters.  
 
4.1.1. Analysis II: SWOT-analysis  
After having examined the status-quo of the 2018/2019 campaigns, the focus of the second part of 
this study’s analysis is dedicated to future possibilities of the EU’s political communication. The 
SWOT-Analysis295 is a tool often used in the business world to examine the future potential of a 
project. The analysis, first developed by Learned, Christensen, Andrews and Guth296 in 1965, 
allows decision makers to investigate “the current situation of an organization at a given time, in 
                                                
293 Seidel, 2006: 110. 
294 Note: Due to the thematic variety of criteria that derive from the study’s main body.  
295 Note: abbreviation for: strength, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. 
296 Edmund P. Learned; Roland C. Christensen; Kenneth R. Andrews; William D. Guth. Business Policy: Text and 
Cases. Harvard Business School, 1965: 1.  
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a forward looking manner”.297 It remains one of the most relevant tools for strategic planning in 
the corporate world and may be considered a “valuable technique for planning and decision 
making.”298 Although the EU is far from being a profit oriented enterprise and its communication 
strategy cannot be considered a business plan, integrating a SWOT-analysis could be considered 
an efficient way to identify possible strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of the EU’s 
communication. Some authors criticise the lack of efficiency of decision makers in the EU and 
argue that “EU institutions should follow best practices from the business sector since these have 
proved to be more effective in the current communication environment.”299 In business, companies 
are pressured by their competitors to constantly improve their services and internal mechanisms 
such as their communication. Although a political competitor of the EU in Europe is nowhere in 
sight, the EU, just like in the corporate world, would be well-advised to constantly improve its 
communication mechanisms. In it’s 2015 “Toolkit for the evaluation of communication 
activities”300 the Commission itself argued this method is a “well-known and widely used approach 
that provides a framework for discussion of the merits and demerits of actual and proposed 
interventions”.301  
 
The SWOT-analysis applied in this study, addresses the EU’s communication department, 
including all the communication agencies of the EU, in particular the DG-Command and the DG-
Regio of the European Council.302 The EU communication agencies’ strengths and weaknesses, 
which also include general EU deficits and advantages that may strengthen or weaken 
communication, were gathered in the following SWOT-matrix. Opportunities and threats, derive 
from the strengths and weaknesses, are determined by external factors such as the previously 
discussed changing environment.  
 
 
                                                
297 Carly Probert. Swot Analysis. Management and Marketing. 50 Minutes, 2015: 7.  
298 Emet Gürel; Merba Tat. SWOT Analysis: A Theoretical Review. The Journal of International Social Research. 
Vol. 10 (51). 2017: 10045.  
299 Niklewicz, 2017: 10.  
300 European Commission. Toolkit for the evaluation of communication activities. 2015: 25. 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/ sites/info/files/communication-evaluation-toolkit_en.pdf (last accessed.2.6.19 / 12:00). 
301 European Commission, 2015: 72.  
302 Note: Mentioned in the previous chapter 3.  
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Figure [1]: EU’s communication department’s SWOT-analysis 
 
Evaluating the findings  
On the side of the strengths the above SWOT-matrix, figure [], includes, among others, the EU’s 
relatively highly developed communication infrastructure with human resources, technological 
know-how of the different communication agencies and technological resources, such as the high 
number of institutions and campaigns present in social media networks and their own 
“webpage”303 or the citizens App. The previous content analysis has shown that the 2018/2019 
communication campaigns have, in most cases, successfully integrated a variety of practical and 
country specific examples to illustrate the impact of the EU in people's daily lives. Also, the 
findings of the first content analysis demonstrate that the EU campaigns were strong in the 
                                                
303 Note: The content analysis has shown that 8 out of 9 examined campaigns had their own personalised webpage.  
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impartiality and objectivity of their messages,304 certainly a strength, if we consider the advantages 
of political PR by Jarren and Donges.305 As regards the weaknesses, a content analysis of the EU’s 
political communication has clearly shown an over-proportional communication of the EU-
Institutions. Campaigns advertising the Union as a whole, like the EU and Me - campaign, were 
rare. Also, the fact that the EU consists of a complex structure of institutions, legislative bodies 
and executive actors306 is an impediment for communication purposes. Additionally, the EU’s 
limited capability to “repair” possible damage in the EU’s relations with its citizens, plus the fact 
that awareness campaigns will hardly ever be able to reach a majority, represent considerable 
weaknesses of the EU’s communication.  
Regarding opportunities, the technological shift certainly offers new ways of communicating and 
engaging citizens through expanding democratic means after the several changes amended by the 
Treaty of Lisbon. The 2007 Treaty of Lisbon Parliament reforms like the extension of the scope 
of co-decision,307 the increasing power in budgetary questions or international agreements or the 
Parliament’s ability to call for legislative amendments.308  
The 2019 European Elections have shown that citizens in Portugal and Germany see a need for 
action in environmental protection, migration and security. All of these are policy fields which 
could eventually best be tackled with on an intergovernmental level such as the EU. The 
willingness and demand of some actors involved to reform and renew the EU may also create a 
window of opportunity for a new approach in its communication. Lastly, the fact that the EU as a 
supranational entity stands for peace and stability in Europe309 while other parts of the world are 
experiencing political instability may raise the citizens interest in the EU’s messages and 
communication. On the one hand, a group led by President Trump, who, according to Monjardino 
tries to demolish the principal founding concepts of the euro-atlanticism.310 On the other hand, the 
increasing influence and economic power of China, which, following Rüger, contribute to a new 
                                                
304 Note: See Analysis I.  
305 Note: See chapter 3.1.  
306 Note: Such as the relation between European Council and European Commission.  
307 Note: Regulated in Art. 289 of the TFEU treaties.  
308 Juan Mayoral. Democratic improvements in the European Union under the Lisbon Treaty. Robert Schuman 
Centre for Advanced Studies, 2011: 2-3. 
309 Note: For more than 60 years.  
310 Miguel Monjardino. Entre a Esperança e a Realidade. Guerra e Paz. Expresso, 15.6.2019.  
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narrative of EU representatives and leaders, promoting the relevance of the EU in politically 
agitated times.311    
 
Turning to the threat that the EU’s political communication apparatus is confronted with, 
globalization may play a key role. Especially the so-called ‘losers’ of the increasing 
interconnectivity of people, information, services and businesses may lose their connection to EU 
institutions and leaders and reject receiving new forms of communication flows. Also, the rise of 
partisan populism as well as nationalism and protectionism due to perceived causes of 
globalisation such as the financial crisis or the migratory crisis312 may polarise civil society 
including citizens’ appreciation of the EU, hampering their support and receptivity of awareness 
campaigns. The ‘social medialisation’ of politics and the potential spread of misinformation as 
well as the possibility of further emerging socio-economic crisis in Europe may also constitute 
serious threats.  
 
Limitations  
Although, as Niklewicz suggests, the EU’s communication officials should not reinvent the wheel 
and should rather employ successful business approaches to their strategy,313 the SWOT-analysis 
cannot be considered a classical method of political science. Gürel and Tat define some operational 
limitations of the method. For these authors, the process of gathering strengths of an organization 
is “prone to bias.”314 Also, the boundaries between what is identified as a strength and as a 
weakness can be blurred, “strengths that are not maintained may become a weakness.”315 The 
authors also argue that the moment-based character of the analysis may be vulnerable to 
unforeseeable future crisis and problems. Lastly, it is argued that the integration of a SWOT-
analysis may overestimate a unique mechanism or measure and decision makers might get too 
preoccupied with it, ignoring other possible problems.316 Despite these limitations and taking into 
account the previously mentioned advantages, using this typically business-oriented method of 
                                                
311 Caroline Rüger. Personal interview. Institut für Politikwissenschaften und Soziologie. Julius-Maximilians-
Universität Würzburg, 1.7.2019.    
312 Note: As discussed in chapter 2.  
313 Niklewicz, 2017: 39.  
314 Gürel; Tat, 2017:1005. 
315 idem: 1004.  
316 ibidem: 1005.  
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analysis to enrich the political discussions on the EU’s political communication perspectives, 
strikes me as being a reasonable, although complementary choice of analysis.  
 
4.2. Lessons Learned from Germany and Portugal 
The cases of Germany and Portugal have demonstrated how two countries with traditionally pro-
European views were politically and economically shaken up by different European crisis. The 
decade of 2008 to 2018 shows the fragility of political support, interest and political culture in 
Europe in challenging times. As seen in previous chapters, the debt crisis of 2008 and 2009 raised, 
especially in Portugal, questions concerning the EU’s crisis management competence. The massive 
influx of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants in 2015 to 2017 put significant strain on member 
states’ solidarity. This could be seen, for instance, in the emergence of anti-migratory movements 
and parties such as “PEGIDA”317 or the “AfD” in Germany.  The subsequent rise of political 
populism from far-left to far-right in the aftermath of both of these crises has given rise to a new 
dimension of anti-European sentiments, which in turn has led to a remarkable reinforcement of 
euro-sceptical parties in the recent election to the European Parliament. Moreover, the massive 
dissemination of digital communication left traditional PR-strategies at a loss. Reacting to these 
shifts in a way that appeals to citizens, whether in Berlin or Lisbon, through reassuring and 
strengthening strong communication ties with them is one of the challenging tasks, EU policy 
makers but also leaders are confronted with these days.  
 
Also, during the course of my research in Lisbon, Saarbrücken, Würzburg and Berlin in the 
antecedent and aftermath of the 2019 European Elections, I was confronted with opinions of 
citizens who feel that the EU plays a role in Brussels or Strasbourg, in Berlin's or Lisbon’s 
executive apparatus, or in the Commission’s representation bureaus, but not necessarily in people’s 
lives. The impression of citizens, that regional politics and local economic growth are 
predominantly the results of decisions taken on a local, regional or national level, accompanied 
me throughout these conversations and my research. One of the EU strategies to achieve a more 
decentralised and regional connection to citizens, apart from the centralised representation 
bureaus, is the “Europe Direct”-information network. Schrötter, who has worked several years for 
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“Europe Direct” and visited numerous schools in Germany to speak and debate EU politics with 
students, argues that, for many citizens, the European idea is still far from their own realities.318 
According to the author, with the exception of some particularly interested students, “for a majority 
of pupils, the processes in ‘Brussels’ were a strange thing, the ‘Ecofin’ a chemical formula and the 
question about the difference between the Council of the EU and the Council of Europe led to 
general confusion”319  
We have seen in previous chapters that Germany’s and Portugal’s regions did benefit significantly 
from several funding mechanisms such as the Cohesion Funds. The list of projects co-financed by 
the EU both in Germany and Portugal, which in many cases were only possible due to the EU’s 
contributions, is quite long. However, the common appreciation of the relevance of this EU-
dimension in our daily lives is still missing. Of course, EU-flagship policies like the Erasmus+ 
programme, the end of roaming within the EU but also the Euro and the freedom of movement are 
achievements that citizens tend to know about and, to a certain degree, take advantage of. But the 
perception that government’s EU contributions return to them through a variety of concrete 
investments on their very own local level is often lacking.320  
 
The cases of Portugal and Germany show how the EU’s image is vulnerable to crises and therefore 
needs to improve its resilience to be successful in the long run. To be able to do so, this study 
attempts to provide some practical recommendations about what can be done to strengthen the 
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5. Concluding discussion and recommendations.  
Throughout this study we have seen how the political reality around the European project is 
shifting and how the EU institutions have reacted. With reference to this study’s research question: 
Can the European Union’s political communication be considered up-to-date with the changing 
environmental influences and shifting patterns in European politics? This study answers as 
follows: Although the EU institutions are making great efforts to make citizens aware of the EU’s 
regional impact through a variety of funding programmes and initiatives, the EU’s institutions are 
missing out to provide answers on how to engage those in the society who feel detached of EU 
politics because of the discussed reasons for euroscepticism and anti-European populism. This 
study’s content analysis showed that, although 7 out of 9 examined campaigns corresponded to 
more than half of the chosen criteria, the campaigns performed the lowest in their response to the 
changing EU-attachment of citizens (H2). This includes a relatively low performance in finding 
adequate answers for confronting euroscepticism on a regional level and avoiding exhaustive use 
of uncustomized and general EU references and examples. As we have seen, the political 
communication of the institutions involves innovative and creative mechanisms of a variety of 
practical examples, of “storytelling” and of impartial content in its messages. This might be an 
important start to further strengthening the EU’s communication. But using these tools in an 
effective manner also means to constantly improve the communication to ensure its full potential 
for reaching citizens.  
 
5.1. Six recommendations  
The results of both the content analysis of selected campaigns of 2018/2019 and the SWOT-
analysis together with the several arguments debated along this study help us focus on future 
possibilities and perspectives in the area. Having in mind the considerable changes in the EU’s 
environment and considering the possible allocation of strengths to realise opportunities and cope 
with possible threats, we are able to take some conclusions for further action needed. These 
conclusions consist in concrete ‘real’-political recommendations for both, political actors in charge 
of the EU institutional communication and national government’s communication. I am 
distinguishing six major recommendations listed as follows: 
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First, promote communication framework to tackle global issues.  
The EU communication has to take advantage of its highly developed media-infrastructure, which 
was identified as a strength in the SWOT-matrix and includes a network of millions of followers 
throughout different communication channels. Using existing technological and human resources 
and frameworks, rather than spending energy on creating new ones, increases the EU’s 
productivity. Problems of a European or global dimension, such as environmental protection, 
migration, security but financial stability, gained, in 2018/2019, increasing public attention in the 
countries considered. The EU could therefore use it’s technological- and human resources, to 
convey citizens a clear message: because none of the member states alone has sufficient political 
as well as material means, the EU is the ideal framework to tackle these issues. Only if such an 
awareness is created among citizens, can the EU’s public image ‘resist’ to shocks in the aftermath 
of crises. People would begin to acknowledge that the EU is, in many cases, a forum to tackle 
crisis rather than the source of it.  
Second, go local to confront euroscepticism and populism. 
The EU’s strength321 to integrate practical and country specific examples of citizens’ success 
stories in its campaigns should be used to confront eurosceptic and populist arguments without 
losing its ‘impartial’ character of political PR. According to both the content and the SWOT-
analysis, the EU’s ability of dealing with topics, such as refugees, migration and financial threats, 
all potential drivers for populism and euroscepticism, was considered a weakness rather than a 
strength. If the EU’s communication therefore actively used “storytelling”, as emphasised by 
Niklewicz,322 successfully integrating this communication-tool into its campaigns, confronting 
negative perspectives of the EU while refraining from sensitive issues topics, it could make a 
difference. Demonstrating to citizens who feel ignored by political elites and left out due to 
globalisation-related developments, how the EU matters in their daily lives, be it through 
kindergarten, the local sports club, senior- citizens homes or solar panels on the village’s town 
hall, may be an effective prevention of losing citizens support and connection to the European 
project. Schrötter argues that “it must be allowed to see the EU with criticism without running the 
risk to be considered ‘extreme’ and ‘populist’ or being silenced.”323 The best way, according to 
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74 
the author, to confront such people is to offer the better arguments, solutions and responses through 
communication.324  
Third, avoid or “detoxify” polemic EU-directives. 
The above does not only apply to the communication of EU-funds but also to communicating EU-
directives: much of anti-European sentiment is generated through misleading conceptions of EU-
directives, which are often considered either constraining, redundant, discriminatory or ridiculous. 
Well-known examples are ‘lightbulbs’, ‘bananas’ and ‘cucumbers’. Although none of these 
polemic directives were initiated by the Commission, they provide apparent justification for a great 
amount of popular EU criticism. Therefore, the Commission would be well advised to probe the 
PR-effect of each new directive, referring those directives back to the initiating member state, 
which would obviously result in a rise of anti-European sentiments. Such a procedure could be 
considered a “PR-enhancement of the principle of subsidiarity.'' 
Fourth, hold member states accountable.  
The EU could commit member states to take more action in communicating the EU policies. As a 
matter of fact, member states, by virtue of Regulation 1303/2013, are even legally bound, to do so 
and to inform citizens “about funding oppor-tunities under operational programmes.”325 The 
European Commission should therefore take a leading role in establishing ways to enforce a 
stronger responsibility of member states to play an active role in the communication process rather 
than an opponent one by assuming praise for successes and blaming the EU for failure. The 
Commission’s leading role could be supported by member states joining forces: Germany and 
Portugal for example. In terms of their appreciation of the EU, both countries have quite a lot in 
common: in both countries, a large and stable majority of citizens take a favourable view of 
European integration. Both countries value the political dimension of the EU: after World War II, 
having emerged from Nazi dictatorship, Germany was eager to join the community of western 
democracies, while Portugal, after the revolution of 1974, was striving for political stability and 
integration into the European project, ending a long period of isolation. Both countries profit 
economically from the EU: while the Euro and the single market provides huge advantages to the 
German economy, Portugal, apart from also profiting from the single market, is benefiting from 
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various funds. Thus, both countries share a vital interest in the continuation and further 
reinforcement of European integration.  
It would therefore make sense, if Germany and Portugal joined forces to assist EU institutions in 
their efforts to overcome emerging anti-European sentiments. Such a German-Portuguese joint-
venture would be perfectly designated against the background of the subsequent German and 
Portuguese presidency of the Council of the European Union in 2020 and 2021.326 Both Countries 
could shape their presidencies with bundled efforts: joint endeavours of a large central European 
and a smaller southern European country, eventually in the context of a bilateral project called 
‘UNSER Europa / A NOSSA Europa.’327 This could contribute significantly to the credibility of 
other pro-European PR-campaigns. 
Fifth, engage the private sector to tackle misinformation. 
Through both phases of analysis, we have found out, that another strength328 of the EU’s 
communication is the way it engages means of political PR, contributing to the impartiality and 
objectivity of the content. Additionally, the fact that the EU was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize 
for having “contributed to the advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human 
rights in Europe”329 could reinforce a possible stabilizing image in politically ‘agitated times’, such 
as between 2008 and 2018.330 Part of these ‘agitated times’ consist of the technological shift and 
the emergence of new media leading to an increase in social media usage. This may have 
“incentivised the spread of misinformation and fake news.”331 It would therefore seem 
indispensable, that the EU’s public relations policy lives up to these challenges. Studies have 
shown, that eurosceptic groups are engaging predominantly in social networks.332 As pointed out 
in chapter 2, these networks provide easy access, high efficiency, large audiences but hardly any 
credibility control, thus allowing for false contents and fake news. The EU should therefore, 
preferentially in cooperation with member states and some of the main social network providers, 
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engage in a private-public-partnership aiming at verifying digital content and promoting access to 
objective sources of information. This initiative could eventually be supported by Portugal and 
Germany in the context of their successive EU-presidencies.  
Sixth, and last, promote the EU as a whole. 
Another weakness of the EU’s communication, as depicted by the SWOT-matrix and as argued by 
several scholars333, is that the EU’s communication is handicapped by the complexity of the EU’s 
own structure. Many citizens might feel overwhelmed by the way EU legislature functions and 
executive and legislative organs interact. Trying to communicate to citizens, which may not be 
interested in politics at all or don’t have a sufficient degree of education, each and every different 
EU institution, agency, department or politician might have the opposite effect as desired. 
Contradictory or even conflicting messages of different EU institutions might transmit a message 
of complexity and confusion to citizens. De Vreese argues that this “intra-institutional competition 
must die! How is the EU ever going to convince anybody if European institutions are competing 
with each other and sending out competing messages?”334 Citizens receiving the communication 
might not be able to relate to the sending entity and therefore ignore or even reject it. Promoting 
messages from the EU as a whole, engaging the political PR mechanisms of the EU institutions 
and also country specific approaches to directly address citizens for example in Germany and 
Portugal could make a decisive difference in raising people’s awareness. After all, former US-
President Henry Kissinger’s famous quote “Who do I call if I want to speak to Europe?”335 could 
also be applicable for what a EU-citizen might feel.  
 
5.2. Summary and final remarks  
Germany and Portugal are good examples on how the EU is present in the citizens’ daily lives. It 
is present even on an individual level: Especially the Cohesion Funds demonstrate how citizens 
benefit on their very local level from EU funding. This study has demonstrated that the EU is not 
just “Brussels”. Rather the EU is Fundão, Chaves, Saarbrücken and Berlin-Wuhlheide. 
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Having said that, the global challenges of the new millennium do not stop in front of the EU’s 
borders. As the examined decade of 2008 to 2018 has shown, the political world has changed in 
many ways since the turn of the century. From a low point in political participation and interest to 
an increase of euroscepticism and anti-europeanism. This was due to a variety of reasons, such as 
the rise of populist parties, the dangers of social media, the EU’s crisis management or the national 
governments tendency to underemphasize EU-achievements, these developments have shapen EU 
politics. They show how the fast moving and interconnecting process of globalisation and 
europeanisation has not only found supporters among citizens from Sintra to Saarbrücken. It was 
through my studies within the MA course in Governance, Leadership and Democracy at the 
Institute for Political Studies in the Catholic University, I often came across the ongoing rise of 
populism and “democratic backsliding”,336 as Bermeo refers to the reversion of the democratic 
process. Examining the ‘Realpolitik’ of the EU in 2018/2019 as regards its communication, it is, 
like previously stated, a challenging and interesting task at the same time. The study’s analysis 
therefore concentrated on nine specific awareness campaigns of the EU institutions of 2018/2019. 
Both the content analysis, which recurred to the use of a criteria catalogue to examine the 
campaigns adaptability, and the SWOT-analysis provided important findings on the status-quo of 
the EU’s communication as well as future perspectives.  
The analysis findings show: the EU has to be better and faster at adapting to the changing realities 
of its people. Engaging a far-from-political-reality approach without mentioning and confronting 
the several drivers of euroscepticism through its communication might lead to a loss of its more 
or less strong impartial character. Also, the study demonstrates the EU’s vulnerability to 
unforeseeable crises. This has to change if the EU wants to avoid losing, again, its connection to 
citizens, as happened in Germany and Portugal in the aftermath of the two major crises 
distinguished in this work.  
 
Closing the communicative gap between what the EU really does for citizens and how citizens 
really relate to the EU, will continue to be regularly part of EU debates and studies. Throughout 
the research process of this study, I have learned a lesson: The lesson that the ‘appetizing’, from 
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an academic point of view, temptation to try to correlate the EU’s communication performance 
with  concrete numbers of support for the institutions is nearly impossible. The different motives 
of citizens to support the EU or the reasons they relate to the EU in a certain form are far too 
heterogeneous and subconscious to be measured and characterised from a macro perspective. 
Nevertheless, what some communication-fanatics might find a bit disappointing can contribute to 
real political opportunities and be a chance for Europe and the EU. It is in this spirit that this study 
has closely examined the communication perspective of the EU’s institutions to find out, whether 
they are using all their potential to contribute to their own sustainability. A sustainability which 
from an EU-point-of-view is certainly needed to not only ‘survive’ in the long run, but to “thrive 
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AfD Alternative für Deutschland 
BE Bloco de Esquerda 
CDU Coligação Democrática Unitária 
DG Directorate-General 
DG-Comm Directorate-General Communication  
DG-Regio Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy  
EAFRD European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development 
EC European Commission 
ECSC European Coal and Steel Community 
EFSI European Fund for Strategic Investments 
EIB European Investment Bank 
EMFF European Maritime and Fisheries Fund 
EP European Parliament 
EPLO European Peacebuilding Liaison Office 
EPRS European Parliamentary Research Service 
ERDF European Regional Development Fund 
ESF European Social Fund 
ESIF European Structural and Investment Funds 
EU European Union 
EU-OSHA European Agency for Safety and Health at Work 
FAZ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GNP Gross National Product 
INE Instituto Nacional de Estatística 
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PCP Partido Comunista Português 
PEGIDA Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes 
PNR Partido Nacional Renovador 
PR Public Relations 
PS Partido Socialista 
PSD Partido Social Democrata 
QCA Quadro Comunitário de Apoio 
QREN Quadro de Referência Estratégica Nacional 
RTP Rádio e Televisão de Portugal 
SMEs Small and medium-sized enterprises 
StBA Statistisches Bundesamt  
SWOT Strengths, Weaknesses Opportunities and Threats 



















Table [2]: Table of findings of content analysis338 
 European Commission  European Parliament Other EU institutions  % 
 C-EC-1 C-EC-2 C-EC-3 C-EC-4 C-EP-1 C-EP-2 C-EU-1 C-EU-2 C-EU-3 Total 
H1 1 0,667 0,6 0,4 0,8333 0,1667 0,8334 0,6667 1 0,6852 
H1-A 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0,7778 
H1-B 1 1 1 - 1 0 1 1 1 0,8750 
H1-C 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0,8889 
H1-D 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0,6667 
H1-E 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0,3333 
H1-F 1 0 - 1 1 0 1 0 1 0,6250 
H2 0,5 0,5 0,1667 0,6 0,3333 0,6667 0,6667 0,8333 0,5 0,5296 
H2-A 0 1 0 - 1 1 1 1 1 0,7500 
H2-B 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0,5556 
H2-C 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0,5556 
H2-D 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0,3333 
H2-E 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0,4444 
H2-F 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0,5556 
H3 0,95 0,5 0,65 0,5 0,25 0,95 0,1 0,65 0,35 0,5444 
H3-A 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0,8889 
H3-B 0,8 1 0,6 0 0 0,8 0,4 0,6 0,4 0,5111 
H3-B-1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0,3333 
H3-B-2 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0,6667 
H3-B-3 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0,4444 
H3-B-4 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0,5556 
H3-B-5 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0,5556 
H3-C 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0,4444 
H3-D 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0,3333 
Total-1 0,8429 0,6429 0,4 0,4167 0,4286 0,5571 0,6 0,7571 0,6714  
Total-2 0,8167 0,5556 0,4722 0,5 0,4722 0,5944 0,5333 0,7167 0,6167 
Total-3 0,5861 0,5333 0,6222 
                                                
338 Legend: “1” - Yes, campaign does fulfill criteria; “0” - No, campaign does not fulfill criteria; “-“ – No data available. 
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Table [2.1.]: Codification of criteria - content analysis  
 
H1 Campaigns convey the importance of EU-impact in the citizens lives 
H1-A Mention concrete funding? 
H1-B Use practical examples? 
H1-C Use specific German or Portuguese cases? 
H1-D Use Storytelling? 
H1-E Use concrete data? 
H1-F Appeal to different generations? 
H2 The campaigns’ content respond to changes in citizens EU-attachment  
H2-A Messages conveyed in a simple way and avoiding technical language? 
H2-B Messages encourage different perspectives on the EU? 
H2-C Are emotions used to trigger interest? 
H2-D Content confronts euroscepticist concerns? 
H2-E Campaigns advertise the Union not the Institutions? 
H2-F Messages incentivise political participation and interest? 
H3 The campaigns tools respond to changes in the media environment 
H3-A Does the campaign have its own website? 
H3-B Social media activity 
H3-B-1 - Facebook? 
H3-B-2 - Instagram? 
H3-B-3 - Twitter? 
H3-B-4 - YouTube? 
H3-B-5 - Posts include video content? 
H3-C Face to face campaigns? 








Table [2.2.]: Codification of campaigns - content analysis  
 
code Code - explanation  Name of the campaign  Main sources used 
C-EC-1 Campaign of the European Commission Nr. 1 EU in My Region Primary source: 
European Commission, 
2018a ;  
Secondary Source: 
Incubator Europe, 2019. 




C-EC-3 Campaign of the European Commission Nr. 3 REGIOSTARS Primary source: 
European Commission, 
2019g,  
Secondary source:  
Elanidou, 2018. 
C-EC-4 Campaign of the European Commission Nr. 4 Citizens Dialogue Primary sources: 
European Commission, 
2019k; 2019h; 2019e. 
Secondary source:  
Elanidou, 2018. 
C-EP-1 Campaign of the European Parliament Nr. 1 What Europe does for Me Primary sources: 
European Parliament 
2019a; 2019b. 
C-EP-2 Campaign of the European Parliament Nr. 2 #thistimeiamvoting Primary source: 
European Parliament, 
2019e.  
C-EU-1 Campaign of other European Institutions Nr. 1 #EUropeans  Primary sources: 
European Council, 2019a; 
2019b.    
C-EU-2 Campaign of other European Institutions Nr. 2 EU and Me / #EUandME Primary sources: 
European Union, 2019c; 
2019d.    
C-EU3 Campaign of other European Institutions Nr. 3 InvestEU / #InvestEU Primary sources: 
European Union, 2019f; 
2019g; 2019h.  
 
 
Table [2.3.]: Codification of scores - content analysis  
Total Average score of the specific criteria or hypothesis  
Total-1 Average score of campaign (including every single criteria) 
Total-2 Average score of campaign (only including performance on hypotheses) 
Total-3 Average score of institutions (only including performance on hypotheses) 
 
